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FORUM CHOICE FOR
TERRORISM SUSPECTS
AZIZ Z. HUQ†
ABSTRACT
What forum should be used to adjudicate the status of persons
suspected of involvement in terrorism? Recent clashes between
Congress and the president as to whether the status of terrorism
suspects should be determined via Article III courts or military
commissions have revived the debate about this venue question. The
problem is typically framed as a matter of legal doctrine, with
statutory and doctrinal rules invoked as dispositive guides for sorting
suspects into either civilian or military venues. This Article takes issue
with the utility of that framing of the problem. It argues that the forum
question can more profitably be analyzed through an institutionaldesign lens. A key institutional-design decision is whether and when
to create jurisdictional redundancy. When, that is, should the existence
of overlapping jurisdictions vest the government with a threshold
choice of forums or an option to retry a suspect who has been
acquitted in an initial process? Jurisdictional redundancy is pervasive.
But conventional wisdom suggests that it is unwise. This Article
demonstrates, however, that overlap among forums has complex
direct and indirect effects on the accuracy and cost of terrorismrelated adjudication. The Article presents a comprehensive
framework for analyzing redundancy by exploring how redundancy
influences error rates, system-maintenance costs, externalities,
information production, and incentives. Applying this framework, I
contend that the conventional wisdom is flawed. Pervasive
redundancy has surprising merit in contrast to two leading reform
proposals that would eliminate most jurisdictional overlap.
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INTRODUCTION
A central, seemingly intractable controversy in national-security
law is the choice of forum for adjudicating the status of terrorism
suspects. Consider the arrest of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame. An
alleged liaison between al Qaeda and the al Shabaab organization of
Somalia, Warsame was seized in April 2011 aboard a fishing skiff in
1
the Gulf of Aden. After two months’ imprisonment on a Navy vessel,
the Somali national was moved to Manhattan for a criminal trial in
2
federal district court. Instead of inspiring praise, news of his capture
and pending prosecution drew criticism from those who argued that
3
Warsame belonged in a military forum. The Warsame case is only
the latest installment in an increasingly heated debate about forum
choice for terrorism suspects. That debate has proved particularly
vexing because suspects linked to al Qaeda and other transnational
groups are seized in a bewildering variety of circumstances, leading to
puzzles not only about the relevant forum but also about the relevant
facts on which forum choice should turn. Imagine, for example, that
Warsame had been captured off the coast of Florida, just outside U.S.
territorial waters. Or that he had been arrested upon entering the
country at Miami International Airport, with explosives on his
person. Or that, upon being pulled from a Yemeni fishing vessel,
Warsame had fished from his pocket a U.S. passport. In each case, the
geography of capture, the suspect’s citizenship, and his or her alleged
actions could vary in ways that are potentially relevant to the forumchoice question.
There is scant domestic consensus on how to allocate suspects
4
among venues to evaluate their long-term detentions. President

1. Ken Gude, Conservatives Outraged over Prosecution of Terror Suspect, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (July 6, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/warsame_trial.html.
2. Id.
3. Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A10.
4. I use the terms “forum” and “venue” interchangeably in this Article without intending
to draw on their technical legal meanings.
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Obama and his opponents in Congress have disagreed sharply on
forum choice not only for suspects seized extraterritorially, such as
5
Warsame, but also for those arrested in the United States. The
Obama administration has endorsed criminal prosecution in Article
6
III courts for some suspects and at one point even threatened to veto
defense appropriations bills containing riders that would limit such
7
proceedings. By contrast, many in Congress favor either the use of
8
military commissions as authorized by a 2009 statute or detention in
9
military custody without any criminal process. These disagreements
10
initially yielded a protracted interbranch stalemate. In late 2011,
5. See, e.g., Halimah Abdullah, McConnell Says Kentucky Could Face Attack if Terror
Suspects Are Held Here, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 15, 2011, http://www.kentucky
.com/2011/06/14/1774656/mcconnell-says-kentucky-could.html (describing Senator. Mitch
McConnell’s argument that terrorism suspects arrested in the United States should not be tried
in the United States); Mitch McConnell, Op-Ed., The Right Place To Try Terrorists, WASH.
POST, June 22, 2011, at A17; Charlie Savage, Attorney General and Senator Clash on Where To
Try Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A20 (discussing an argument between the
Obama administration and Senator McConnell over whether suspects captured on American
soil should be prosecuted in America or at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base); Charlie Savage,
Developments Rekindle Debate over Best Approach for Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2011, at A14 (noting some arguments between conservatives and President Obama over forum
choice).
6. The Obama administration has taken this position with respect to at least those
suspects who are detained inside the United States. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to
Our Values and Laws, Remarks at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-securityadhering-our-values-an (“[I]t is the firm position of the Obama Administration that suspected
terrorists arrested inside the United States will—in keeping with long-standing tradition—be
processed through our Article III courts.”).
7. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 1540—NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2–3 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr1540r_20110524.pdf (“The Administration strongly objects to
the provisions that limit the use of authorized funds . . . regarding prosecution of
detainees. . . . If the final bill presented to the President includes these provisions . . . , the
President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto.”); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: S. 1867—NATIONAL
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2–3 (2011), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saps1867s_20111117.pdf (repeating the
veto threat).
8. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2574
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a–950t (Supp. IV 2010)).
9. See, e.g., Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Reform Act: Detention Policy and
Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 269–70 (2011) (endorsing continued use of
military detention); see also infra Parts I.C–D, IV.A–B.
10. The executive branch has made two failed attempts to resolve the stalemate. First, on
November 13, 2009, the Departments of Justice and Defense announced charges against five
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Congress enacted a series of ambiguously worded provisions in a
11
military appropriations bill. These novel provisions might make the
executive’s use of Article III forums more difficult, but they do not
12
conclusively resolve the forum-choice debate. Throughout these
controversies, however, one point of general agreement has persisted:
a belief that the jurisdictional arrangements that had long obtained in
13
the post-9/11 decade were “dysfunctional.”
The question of forum choice typically is framed as a question of
law. In particular, the inquiry is framed as turning upon whether,
under international or domestic law, a suspect can or should be
14
categorized as a “criminal” or a “combatant”. Those who read the
law to categorize alleged terrorists such as Warsame as combatants

Guantánamo detainees in federal court and against five others in military commissions. Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Departments of Justice and Defense Announce Forum Decisions
for Ten Guantánamo Bay Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2009/November/09-ag-1224.html. The decision to use Article III courts was so controversial that
the administration backed down. See Editorial, Cowardice Blocks the 9/11 Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2011, at A22. (“That retreat [from trying Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in New York City]
was a victory for Congressional pandering and an embarrassment for the Obama
administration, which failed to stand up for it.”). Second, on January 22, 2010, an interagency
task force on Guantánamo announced a series of forum choices. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK
FORCE, FINAL REPORT, at ii (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-reviewfinal-report.pdf. Its judgment has never been operationalized.
11. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 2012), Pub. L.
No. 112-81, §§ 1021–1034 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). This law is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 312–22.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Editorial, What To Do with Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 5, 2011, at A10.
14. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the
Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 770–71 (2011) (noting the distinction between possible
categories for suspected terrorists); see also Gregory Maggs, Assessing the Legality of Law
Enforcement Measures Without Characterizing Them as Law Enforcement or Military Action, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 661, 663 (2006) (noting questions about whether military or criminal law applies
to certain defendants); Benjamin J. Priester, Who Is a Terrorist? Drawing the Line Between
Criminal Defendants and Military Enemies, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1255, 1257 (distinguishing
between criminal defendants and military enemies); Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military
Detention in the War Against al-Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that the
type distinction in international law is not combatancy but enmity). International law, however,
is more complex than this dichotomy suggests: “[t]reaties long have recognized that a state may
detain without trial not only opposing armed forces, but also civilians and others who pose
threats to its security.” Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 403, 403 (2009); see also Monica Hakimi, International Standards for
Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J.
INT’L L. 369, 373–74 (2008) (arguing that the debate about the combatant/civilian line is “stale”
and arguing that human-rights law provides a new perspective on the proper scope of
permissible detention authority under international law).
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see military jurisdiction as proper. Those who insist that
“[t]errorism . . . is a crime [that] has historically been addressed
through criminal prosecution,” by contrast, view Article III courts as
16
the appropriate forum as a matter of law. On both sides, legal
categories are invoked as guideposts for matching suspects such as
17
Warsame exclusively to one or another forum. The literature
therefore focuses closely on the procedural rules and substantive law
18
employed in a given venue. But the ensuing legal line-drawing
exercises have proved divisive and inconclusive. Conventional legal
19
analysis has failed to supply clear answers. This failure is not
surprising. The legal categories of “combatant,” “criminal,” and
15. See, e.g., Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 351 (2003) (arguing that if the “military approach” to antiterrorism prevails, the United States “will understand that religious fundamentalists who attack
military targets in the Middle East or elsewhere and defend their homeland are, in essence,
soldiers”); Josh Tyrangiel, And Justice For . . ., TIME, Nov. 26, 2001, at 66 (describing President
Bush’s characterization of terrorists as soldiers as a justification for the use of military
commissions).
16. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 728 (2009); see also RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR.,
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS (2008) (discussing the history of cases addressing terrorism in Article III
courts); Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Comment, Don’t Repackage Gitmo!, NATION, Dec. 25,
2008, at 8 (criticizing arguments “that holding some terror suspects without trial or charges is
necessary”); Jameel Jaffer & Ben Wizner, Don’t Replace the Old Guantánamo with a New One,
SALON (Dec. 9, 2008, 6:58 AM EST), http://www.salon.com/2008/12/09/guantanamo_3/singleton.
(“The class of people who cannot be prosecuted [in Article III courts] but are too dangerous to
let go is either very small or nonexistent.”).
17. Not all scholars and commentators draw absolute positions. Some make fine-grained
distinctions between suspects based on the locus of capture or the substance of accusations to
ascertain who is a “criminal” and who is a “combatant.” Professors Gabriella Blum and Philip
Heymann allocate suspects to criminal or military venues based on their locus of capture.
GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS, AND TERRORISTS: LESSONS
FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM 105 (2010). Benjamin Wittes, by contrast, relies on a suspect’s
status and behavior. BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE
IN THE AGE OF TERROR 146 (2008).
18. For recent examples of excellent treatments of substantive and procedural issues, see,
respectively, Chesney, supra note 14, at 805–48; and Matthew C. Waxman, Guantánamo,
Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof: Viewing the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 245 (2009). For a review of the uses of law enforcement by a former assistant
attorney general for national security, see David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a
Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Tom Toles, Editorial, A Framework for Detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2011, at A20 (“Just days after President Obama issued an executive order to govern long-term
detentions at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Republican members of the
House and Senate shot back by offering their own, strikingly different proposals.”); Jack
Goldsmith, Op-Ed., A Way Past the Terrorist Detention Gridlock, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2010,
at A25 (identifying the political deadlock).
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“terrorist” are not natural classifications. Their boundaries have
turned out to be controversial on normative and legal grounds—
probably irredeemably so. The utility of static legal rules is also
vulnerable to erosion by fast-moving circumstances. For instance,
rapid changes to al Qaeda’s organizational structure have cast doubt
20
on the durability of longstanding legal typologies. Ultimately,
substantive legal categories are unlikely to generate clear
jurisdictional lines that will enable the allocation of different suspects
21
to distinct venues.
This Article presents an alternative approach to the problem of
forum choice for terrorism suspects. Its central premise is that the
decision about how to adjudicate the status of suspected terrorists can
be approached as a problem of institutional design rather than as a
matter of pure legal doctrine. An institutional-design perspective asks
how to “divid[e] the government into units that will provide the best
22
possible set of public policies and government services.” It treats
policy outcomes as a function of the architecture of adjudicative
23
institutions. The pivotal difference between the doctrinal and
institutional-design approaches can be captured pithily in the
following way: legal analysis hinges on how a particular suspect should
be categorized. Is Warsame a criminal or a combatant? By contrast,
an institutional-design analysis takes a step backward in time from the

20. See Leah Farrall, How al Qaeda Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say
About Its Strengths, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 128, 136–37 (describing changes to al
Qaeda); Keith Johnson, Officials Spotlight Domestic Terrorism Threat, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2011, at A5 (“[L]one-wolf extremists with little or no formal connection to al Qaeda have
proliferated and are potentially plotting small-scale attacks in the U.S[.], officials said.”).
21. This difficulty is quite apart from the problem of how to sort suspects prior to any
threshold adjudication of status. That is, are suspects to be slotted into different venues based
on what the suspect has conceded or what the government has alleged? Surprisingly, there is no
crisp judicial treatment of this nettlesome question.
22. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004). Institutions can be defined broadly as “clusters of norms with
strong but variable mechanisms of support and enforcement that regulate and sustain an
important area of social life.” DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, USABLE THEORY: ANALYTIC
TOOLS FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESEARCH 210 (2009). I use the term here to refer to
“formal institutions that are legally binding.” Id. at 212.
23. See Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems:
Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 716, 716–17 (1986) (arguing that the
institutional architecture of complex institutions, and in particular their use of functional
redundancies, influences outcomes); see also Todd L. LaPorte & Paula M. Consolini, Working
in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of “High-Reliability Organizations,” 1 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 19, 21–22 (1991) (describing research into optimal organizational
form in contexts in which system failures are associated with unacceptably high costs).
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moment of capture. It looks instead at how the government’s choice
should be structured ex ante to elicit the best outcomes—a question
that is peripheral to dominant doctrinal modes of analysis. An
institutional-design inquiry, unlike a doctrinal analysis, thereby aims
to capture both direct and indirect connections between forum choice
and policy goals. By refocusing the debate away from legal doctrine
onto the causal consequences of unexamined architectural choices, an
institutional-design lens usefully sidelines highly disputed normative
questions about the character of terrorism as either war or crime. It
instead generates a set of metrics that all sides of the debate should
find acceptable and brings to the surface issues and mechanisms that
have been obscured by a relentless focus on existing doctrine.
More specifically, I contend that a central institutional-design
choice is whether or not to create jurisdictional redundancy in forum
choice for terrorism suspects. Redundancy, as I use the term in this
Article, means that for any suspect, the government has an
overlapping set of venue options. Redundancy can take two forms.
First, when a suspect such as Warsame is seized, the law could vest
the government with a choice between different forums initially.
Second, it could give the government an option to invoke a substitute
venue should an initial forum fail to validate the government’s
threshold detention. For example, if Warsame is acquitted in an
Article III court, the law might allow him to be tried subsequently by
a military commission. In other words, redundancy can be either
simultaneous or sequential. Jurisdictional redundancy of both stripes
is ubiquitous in the existing institutional framework for terrorist
detention. Leading reform proposals, however, aim to eliminate most
24
redundancy in favor of jurisdictional parsimony. One conclusion of
my analysis is that the wholesale elimination of redundancy may be
undesirable, although the effects of more modest jurisdictional
modifications are far less clear.
Legal and institutional studies in other contexts have identified
25
the value of redundancy as an element in institutional design.

24. See infra Part IV.A–B.
25. For a model of political redundancy, see Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of
Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 274 (2003). For an analysis of redundancy in a
different national-security context, see Scott D. Sagan, The Problem of Redundancy Problem:
Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 935
(2004). For analysis in the corporate-form context, see generally Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian &
Chenggang Xu, Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form, 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 359
(2000); and Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland & Chenggang Xu, Coordination and Experimentation
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Analysis of redundancy is also familiar to public-law scholars, some of
whom, because of their exposure to the legal-process school, have
been acclimatized to think about the law in terms of interactions
26
among diverse government institutions. In the 1960s and 1970s,
jurisdictional overlap provided a lens for assessing the overlap of state
criminal adjudication and postconviction collateral review in habeas
27
corpus by federal courts. More recently, scholars of the federal
administrative state have remarked upon the ubiquity of jurisdictional
redundancy in the regulatory state, giving rise to literature on the
28
effects of overlapping jurisdictions. Collectively, these streams of
scholarship provide rich tools for thinking about the institutionaldesign problem in terrorist detention. But although some scholars
have exploited these tools to think in innovative ways about the
29
national-security bureaucracy, no one has applied them to the
specific forum-choice question respecting terrorism suspects.

in M-Form and U-Form Organizations, 114 J. POL. ECON. 366 (2006). Redundancy of a
different kind has been explored in the criminal-law literature on overcriminalization. See, e.g.,
Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 230 (2007)
(discussing redundancy in the coverage of state and federal criminal law).
26. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction
to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at lx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (“In a government seeking to advance the public interest, each organ has a special
competence or expertise, and the key to good government is not just figuring out what is the
best policy, but figuring out which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the
institutions should interrelate.”).
27. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981) (defending the existence of jurisdictional
overlap).
28. The most recent contributions in the law literature are Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping
and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201 [hereinafter
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction]; Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96
VA. L. REV. 301, 315–23 (2010) [hereinafter Gersen, Unbundled Powers]; and Jason Marisam,
Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 185, 218–44 (2011). See also Jody Freeman &
Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012). For an excellent survey of the political-science literature, see JONATHAN B. BENDOR,
PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT 24–65 (1985). For examples of the
important work done on redundancy in other contexts, compare Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax
and Spending Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (2006) (cautiously endorsing a role for
redundancy in institutional design), with Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 22, at 999–1006
(arguing that economies of scale make consolidation of some social-welfare programs in the
Internal Revenue Service valuable).
29. See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1684–91 (2006)
(focusing on how centralized the intelligence function should be).

HUQ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1424

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/20/2012 12:33 AM

[Vol. 61:1415

The dearth of scholarship on the terrorist-detention question is a
further reason to attend to overlap in institutional design.
Jurisdictional redundancy turns out to be a unifying variable that is
uniquely positioned to explain how forum choice influences policy
outcomes. Moreover, most or all pending reform ideas concerning
terrorism forum choice are, in effect, suggested adjustments to the
quantum of extant jurisdictional redundancy in the terrorist-detention
system. Bills that preclude the transfer of detainees at the
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base for trial in the United States, for
30
example, narrow jurisdictional overlap. Adding conspiracy offenses
to the list of substantive crimes that can be tried by a military
31
commission, by contrast, increases the overlap between military and
civilian systems. Changes to procedural rules will also increase or
decrease the executive’s choice between forums and can therefore be
32
recharacterized as adjustments to jurisdictional overlap.
Overlap among venues appears at first blush a peculiar, even
counterintuitive, design choice that reformers would be wise to oust—
as many indeed hope to do. Redundancy might be taken as an
invitation to the government to engage in abusive behavior. Or it
might be attacked as a waste of resources. Why establish a
multiplicity of forums when a single forum could be modified to
account for the new policy demands of post-9/11 national security?
Perhaps the answer is simply that increasingly outdated and irrelevant
constitutional rules have guarded some forums from reform while
33
placing no constraints on the creation of new forums. Perhaps as a
result of such perverse jurisdictional entrenchment, creating a new
forum is easier than altering the rules of an existing one. Perhaps the

30. See, e.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L.
No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (prohibiting the expenditure of Pentagon funds on
detainee transfers).
31. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29) (Supp. IV 2010) (allowing conspiracy prosecutions in military
commissions).
32. Some scholars have made the distinct point that the military and Article III criminal
systems are converging in substantive predicates and procedural constraints. Robert Chesney &
Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1080–81 (2008). Convergence entails common procedural and substantive
standards, conditions that are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish jurisdictional overlap.
Professors Chesney and Goldsmith’s useful article, as a result, does not discuss overlap as that
term is used here.
33. That is, redundancy is the product of “institutional development rather than
institutional choice.” PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL
ANALYSIS 15 (2004).
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net effect is a costly and needless multiplicity of forums that ought to
be extinguished.
This story contains a grain of truth, but not much more. Pathdependent historical developments likely play a role in shaping forum
choice, and overlapping jurisdictions create some risk of abuse. But
this story also radically oversimplifies. It fails to capture important
benefits of redundancy and elides important tradeoffs in the choice
between jurisdictional parsimony and redundancy. Channeling the
government into one forum, I argue, results in policy outcomes that
are very different from the outcomes of jurisdictional redundancy,
and it is far from clear that the ensuing changes would all be for the
better. A central task in institutional design is analyzing, rather than
taking for granted, the complex and multiple mechanisms that
connect jurisdictional choice to policy outcomes. In this endeavor, my
analysis takes the central policy goals in terrorist detention to be
captured by labels of accuracy and cost minimization—an assumption
that I defend at greater length in Part III. Within this framework of
analysis, the government wishes to detain the correct people, however
defined, by applying the law correctly to the facts, and it wishes to do
so with a minimum of transaction costs. Beyond transaction costs,
detaining the wrong people has two potential downstream costs: the
dissipated liberty interests of the incorrectly detained and the
marginal increase in the risk of terrorism imposed when the
government fails to detain the correct person.
This Article argues that jurisdictional redundancy has both direct
and indirect costs, only some of which are accuracy related. Changes
to jurisdictional specifications induce immediate changes to error
rates, marginal government expenditures, and public externalities.
But they also have indirect effects of a lesser magnitude: they
influence the principal-agent relationship between Congress and
government officials and change the way information about terrorism
is gathered and disseminated. Compounded over time, even indirect
effects may work major reallocations in national-security policy.
By examining the direct and indirect links between jurisdictional
redundancy and policy outcomes, this Article provides a generally
applicable framework for the analysis of the forum-choice question
for terrorism suspects. It does so, moreover, without reliance on
contested assumptions about the relative priority of liberty or
security. Nor does it draw on controversial legal assumptions about
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the content of constitutional norms. I make no claims here, for
example, about the proper measure of due process, the necessary
allocation of authority among the branches, or the appropriate moral
censure to be directed at those accused of terrorism. Such claims
would be necessarily controversial. The constitutional norms at issue
35
are generally poorly defined. The basic normative issues are highly
divisive. Yet even bracketing these issues, it is still possible to capture
many of the relevant normative concerns by focusing parsimoniously
36
on questions of accuracy and other costs.
Applying this analytic framework to pending reform proposals, I
reach a conclusion that is at odds with the conventional wisdom.
Rather than deploring overlap and celebrating singularity, I argue
that the status quo will be hard to improve upon solely by eliminating
any quantum of systemic redundancy. Counterterrorism, I conclude,
is a domain in which redundancy is likely to have far more benefits
37
than costs.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I motivates the analysis
by specifying the historically plural pathways for terrorist detention.
Part II explains why jurisdictional redundancy is an appropriate lens
for the analysis. It provides a precise and intuitive definition of
“jurisdictional redundancy” and demonstrates the ubiquity,
34. I bracket the question of who should make the choice of institutional design, Congress
or the executive. That is a separate inquiry that raises distinct and complex questions.
35. Further, as I argue elsewhere, abstract principles of structural constitutionalism supply
unreliable guides for current policymaking. See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as
Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2012) (arguing against the use of
structural inferences from separation-of-powers principles to policy outcomes in the
counterterrorism domain).
36. I do not intend to suggest that normative considerations of fairness, justice, and
reciprocity are unimportant, only that it is far more useful to analyze institutional-design choices
in quantifiable metrics of accuracy and costs. Arguments couched in terms of normative
terminology in the counterterrorism domain risk lapsing into declamatory solecisms with almost
no tractable analytic content.
37. There is a related set of problems about duplication and exceptionalism. For example,
rather than creating interjurisdictional redundancy, an institutional designer might wish to
create jurisdictional redundancy within a specific court system by establishing a specialized
Article III bench for terrorism cases or by increasing the number of levels of appellate review.
Cf. Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
379, 381 (1995) (arguing for investments in appellate review rather than a better trial process
because “litigants possess information about the occurrence of error and appeals courts can
frequently verify it”). Or the institutional designer might think it preferable to opt out of current
jurisdictional arrangements entirely by the simple expedient of transferring suspects to third
countries. To maintain tractability in the analysis, I have chosen not to address these extensions.
My aim here is more narrow; I identify redundancy as an important parameter, and I nudge
readers toward a more positive assessment of redundancy than is standard in the literature.
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pervasiveness, and durability of such redundancy. Part III is the core
of the Article. It presents a comprehensive typology of redundancy’s
effects on policy outcomes. By systematically exploring mechanisms
that link redundancy to policy outcomes, I provide a vocabulary for
identifying the downstream consequences of changing forum-choice
rules. I begin by focusing on the direct effects of jurisdictional
specifications on accuracy and cost. I then consider indirect effects.
Finally, Part IV applies the analytic framework developed in Part III
to two popular reform ideas. The reform proposals I address are
extreme in the sense that they wholly militate against the existence of
any redundancy. Whatever uncertainty exists about more modest
marginal changes to jurisdictional specifications, I contend that the
wholesale elimination of redundancy is unlikely to have desirable
effects.
I. PLURAL PATHWAYS IN TERRORIST DETENTION
Imagine that federal authorities have identified, and wish to
detain for a protracted period, a person they suspect is linked to a
terrorist group. Perhaps, like Warsame, the person was detained
overseas in a place over which no functioning state exercises legal
38
control. Perhaps he was detained on U.S. soil upon arrival at an
international entry point after having attempted to commit an act of
39
terrorism en route. Or perhaps he was arrested in the Philadelphia
suburbs for plotting attacks on Danish cartoonists perceived to have
40
given religious insult. Whatever the circumstances of a suspect’s
seizure, the government almost always has a range of venue choices.
Depending on the available evidence about a suspect, the suspect’s
nationality, the locus of capture, and other factors, federal authorities
can select from the following forums to make determinations about
the suspect’s potential long-term detention: Article III criminal
38. This is not an implausible scenario given the al Qaeda presence in both Yemen and
Somalia. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 111TH CONG., AL QAEDA
IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA: A TICKING TIME BOMB (Comm. Print 2010) (chronicling the
movement of al Qaeda militants to Yemen and Somalia, areas with weak central governments).
39. See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, White House Review
Summary Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack (Jan. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/white-house-review-summary-regarding-12252009attempted-terrorist-attack (describing an attempt by the Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
to explode a bomb on a Detroit-bound airplane).
40. Charlie Savage, American Indicted on Terror Charges in Plot To Kill Swedish
Cartoonist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A14 (describing the arrest of Colleen LaRose, a.k.a.
“JihadJane”).
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detention, material-witness detention, immigration-related detention,
military detention for the purpose of prosecution in a military
41
commission, and detention as an “enemy combatant.”
This Part maps these options as a prelude to defining and
42
exploring the effects of jurisdictional redundancy. The government’s
choice set can be reduced to two dimensions: First, should a detention
be civilian or military? Second, should a detention turn on a criminal
conviction or not? Table 1 summarizes the ensuing choice set.
Table 1. The Government’s Choice Set in Terrorist Detention
Non-Criminal

Criminal

Civilian

 Immigration-related detention
 Material-witness detention

 Article III criminal prosecution
for a terrorism offense
 Article III prosecution for nonterrorism offenses
43
 Extradition

Military

 Enemy-combatant detention

 Military commission

44

41. The government’s choice set is likely to be smallest when the suspect is a U.S. citizen
detained in the United States. But even here, noncriminal detention under the material-witness
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006), and perhaps military detention may be available as a matter of
current law.
42. I do not include venue options employed by other nations but not by the United States,
such as a civilian system specifically designed for terrorist detention. I also do not address the
question of why the government should use process at all. The government currently does not
use process in all cases. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, no formal process external to the
detaining entities is used. The U.S. targeted-killing program also operates without external
oversight. Yet a wholesale move away from some degree of process seems unlikely. Process
seems desirable as a sorting device to minimize errors, as a way to ensure internal discipline
within the government, and as a means of minimizing reputational harms and maintaining ruleof-law values.
43. The forum-choice analysis here is artificially cabined to American options. It would be
possible to expand the analysis by including the possibility of opt-outs to other jurisdictions.
Such transfers, however, seem to me to be relatively rare—or at least I have seen little evidence
that they are occurring. To speculate, this may be because some states, such as those in Europe,
demand compliance with costly legal rules to effect a transfer whereas others, such as Syria,
Jordan, and other historical partners in intelligence cooperation, are not necessarily reliable or
stable partners given the changes to Arab political regimes since the beginning of 2011.
44. There is a second military venue—the courts-martial system established under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2006) (vesting courts-martial with
general jurisdiction over any person amenable to trial under the laws of war). But this possibility
has not been raised seriously in ongoing debates about terrorist detention, and so it is not
analyzed here.
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The pathways identified in Table 1 differ along several
45
dimensions. First, each has a different jurisdictional trigger.
Immigration detention, for example, is available only for noncitizens,
whereas the criminal law can be applied to both citizens and
noncitizens. Second, each venue is also linked to distinct substantive
grounds for detention. The reach of federal criminal law or
46
immigration law is, for instance, distinct from that of the military
47
commissions. Third, each venue employs different procedural rules.
Criminal processes tend to give more robust protections to detainees
than noncriminal processes—for example, through the imposition of a
higher burden of proof on the government, the defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel, and the application of more stringent
48
evidentiary rules regarding hearsay.
The procedural and substantive differences among pathways,
however, should not be exaggerated. Professors Robert Chesney and
Jack Goldsmith cogently argue that the gaps have narrowed such that
a focus on the incremental differences in procedural and substantivelaw frameworks may obscure more significant functional congruence
among the various bundles of procedural and substantive rules
49
employed in different forums. Professors Chesney and Goldsmith
are surely right to some degree, although significant procedural
differences still distinguish venues. Extending their insight, I argue
that it is profitable to focus on the institutional architecture of forum
choice rather than on discrete procedural or substantive differences.
A threshold caveat to the analysis is in order. As Table 1
indicates, my focus in this Article is the government’s forum-choice
architecture and its relationship to officials’ incentives and behavior.
The analysis might be extended in two ways: First, I could account for
the possibility of officials’ ultra vires options, such as the use of
clearly illegal forms of detention or transfer. For the purposes of this

45. For example, the statutory authority for immigration courts is provided in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1329 (2006), for military commissions in 10 U.S.C. § 817 (2006), and for criminal trials in 18
U.S.C. § 3231 (2006).
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006) (listing the grounds for deportation).
47. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t (Supp. IV 2010) (listing offenses).
48. Article III courts also provide more robust protections than military commissions. For
a helpful primer on the procedural differences between military commissions and Article III
courts, see JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40932, COMPARISON OF RIGHTS IN
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT 8–24 (2010).
49. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 1800–01; see also ELSEA, supra note 48, at 1–7
(noting the remaining differences).
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analysis, however, I have chosen to make the assumption that officials
are relatively law-abiding. Second, I could incorporate the detainee’s
choice set. At first blush, it might appear that detainees have little
freedom of choice because they never select the forum used for their
status adjudication. Nevertheless, several forms of strategic behavior
by detainees are conceivable. First, they might attempt to evade
50
military jurisdiction by seeking injunctive relief in federal court.
Second, they might invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction to relitigate
51
previously rendered status determinations following a release. Third,
the availability of habeas corpus review of military detention might
itself be seen as a form of redundancy that allows detainees to
allocate resources strategically between first-round and second-round
52
reviews. In light of these possibilities, one could imagine
jurisdictional schemes that vest detainees with a wider range of
options as a means of encouraging Pareto-optimal deals. Consider,
for example, the operation of plea agreements in counterterrorism
53
cases in which leniency is exchanged for valuable information. Could
that model be extended to allow trades of information for procedural
protection? Or would such a system have perverse and undesirable
outcomes? Although I recognize the importance of these questions, I
do not address them here. I focus on interactions between
institutional design and government behavior, interactions that are
both less studied and arguably more consequential for the basic
architecture of forum choice.

50. See, e.g., Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (D.D.C. 2008) (rejecting a detainee’s
request for a stay of military-commission proceedings).
51. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting damages actions
on qualified-immunity grounds).
52. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (discussing a detainee’s right
on review to supplement the record with exculpatory evidence not previously presented in prior
proceedings). Given the stakes for individual defendants, however, I am skeptical that adding
civilian court review to a military hearing would have much marginal effect on a defendant’s
efforts in a first-round review process.
53. One study found that 59.8 percent of terrorism prosecutions between 2001 and 2009
ended in plea deals. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
2009 UPDATE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, at 9 fig.7.
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A. Article III Criminal Prosecutions
Notwithstanding controversy over its continued use in the
54
terrorism context, the criminal-justice system has been the most
numerically significant terrorist-detention tool outside of the active
battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. One empirical study identifies
998 defendants who were indicted in what the U.S. Department of
Justice characterized as “terrorism prosecutions” between September
55
2001 and September 2010. Of that number, 87 percent of the
56
defendants were convicted on at least one charge. Another study,
analyzing data from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys,
identifies 8896 individuals referred for terrorism-related prosecution
57
between fiscal years 2004 and 2008. The frequency of terrorism
trials, however, has not been constant across time, as Figure 1
illustrates.
58

Figure 1. Terrorism Prosecutions Filed in Federal Court

54. See, e.g., Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen. of the U.S., Statement of the Attorney
General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html (noting opposition to the use of
Article III courts in certain high-profile cases). For a perspective on battlefield detentions in
Iraq, see Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives
from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 549 (2011). My own experience as counsel for
U.S. detainees in Iraq is not wholly consistent with Professor Chesney’s presentation, but his
article nonetheless contains many valuable insights.
55. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2010, at 4 (2010), available at http://www.lawandsecurity
.org/Portals/0/documents/01_TTRC2010Final1.pdf.
56. Id.
57. Who Is a Terrorist?: Government Failure To Define Terrorism Undermines
Enforcement, Puts Civil Liberties at Risk, TRAC REP. (Sept. 28, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/trac
reports/terrorism/215.
58. As Terrorism Prosecutions Decline, Extent of Threat Remains Unclear, TRAC REP.
(May 18, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/231.
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Use of the criminal system for counterterrorism peaked in 2002
and declined sharply thereafter. Nevertheless, the volume of
prosecutions in 2012 is still about three times pre-2001 levels.
What offenses are charged in these prosecutions? Material59
support offenses play a major role. One analysis of “the [fifty]
highest-profile non-financial” terrorism cases in the post-9/11 decade
finds that 80 percent of convictions involved one of the four federal
60
material-support offenses. Congress first enacted a material-support
prohibition in 1994 to criminalize knowingly aiding or abetting
enumerated terrorist acts, which were defined in relation to offenses
61
that were already enumerated in the U.S. Code. Congress added a
second material-support crime in the Antiterrorism and Effective
62
Death Penalty Act of 1996. This second material-support offense
applies to knowingly aiding foreign organizations designated as
63
“terrorist” by the secretary of state. After being whittled down
64
through First Amendment challenges, the provision that prohibits
providing material support to designated groups survived a
65
constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court in 2010. After the
September 11 attacks, Congress further amended the material-

59. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 446–92 (2007) (reviewing the use of
material-support statutes).
60. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 55, at 6, 13 fig.14.
61. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec.
120005(a), § 2339A, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022–23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)).
The statute defines terrorist acts by reference to other provisions in the U.S. Code. A common
material-support theory will allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006), which criminalizes the
conspiracy to murder, maim, or injure persons in a foreign country. E.g., Indictment at 1, United
States v. Mohamed, No. 0:09-cr-00352-RHK-JJG (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2009) (charging material
support under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1)(2006)).
62. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec.
303(a), § 2339B, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4) (2006) (vesting the secretary of state with designation
authority).
64. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2000)
(invalidating two varieties of material support as impermissibly vague).
65. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2010) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s challenge to the applications of 29 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006), one of several materialsupport provisions); cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (exploring the difficulty of reconciling Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
130 S. Ct. 2705, with standard First Amendment doctrine).
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support statute to extend its reach to terrorism financing and
67
attendance at foreign terrorist training camps. By expanding the
statute along these dimensions, Congress ensured that the materialsupport prohibition—like prohibitions dealing with other terrorism68
related offenses—applies without regard to citizenship
or
69
geography. Thus, a May 2011 indictment lodged in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky charged two noncitizens
with raising money in Kentucky and planting explosives in Iraq—all
70
under a material-support rubric. This indictment suggests how
varied the actus reus requirement for material support can be. In
addition, it is very difficult to challenge the designations of
organizations as “terrorist” for the purpose of the material-support
71
statutes.
Absent evidence of a terrorism offense, prosecutors also exploit
the wide array of regulatory and financial offenses that are available
under federal law to secure what some have called “pretextual”
72
convictions. Like the famous tax prosecution of Al Capone,
pretextual prosecutions employ one of the federal law’s diverse
semiregulatory offenses, such as wire fraud or making
misrepresentations to a federal official, to impose hefty penalties on

66. Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-197, tit. II, sec. 202(a), § 2339C, 116 Stat. 724, 724–27 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2339C (2006)).
67. Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, tit. VI, subtit. G, sec. 6602, § 2339D, 118 Stat. 3761, 3761–62 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339D
(2006)).
68. The offense of treason may be limited by citizenship. But see Carlton F.W. Larson, The
Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 863, 877–78 (2006) (suggesting English precedent for the prosecution of aliens for
treason). Even if treason is limited to citizens, the substantively cognate sedition conspiracy, 18
U.S.C. § 2384 (2006), can be used against noncitizens. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88,
103, 111–16 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (discussing the relation of treason to seditious
conspiracy).
69. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(d), 2339C(b)(2), 2339D(b) (2006).
70. Indictment at 1–4, United States v. Alwan, No. 1:11 CR-13-R (W.D. Ky. Apr. 14, 2011),
available at http://assets.nationaljournal.com/pdf/Unsealed_Alwan_Hammadi_Indictment.pdf;
see also McConnell, supra note 5 (noting the nationalities of the defendants).
71. See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (rejecting a challenge to the designation). But see People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 225–28 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding in favor of a designated
organization).
72. E.g., Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 618–24 (2005).
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73

defendants. Warsame, for example, was charged with use or
possession of a firearm in connection to a crime of violence, an
74
offense with a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years.
75
Because the substance of federal criminal law is expansively defined,
76
pretextual prosecutions are easy to gin up. Factoring in terrorismrelated sentencing enhancements, the resulting penalties can be
77
daunting.
B. Noncriminal Civil Detention
Even in the absence of criminal culpability, Article III courts can
be tools for detention based on federal immigration powers or the
statutory authority to detain “material witnesses.” These forms of
civil detention do not entail the searching burdens of proof imposed
by the criminal law but also do not permit imprisonment for years—
78
as opposed to mere days or months. Both were employed
extensively after September 2001. A Department of Justice inspector
general’s report found that at least 1182 noncitizens had been held
79
under immigration powers in relation to post-9/11 investigations.
This expansive use of immigration powers was facilitated by both the
existence of reserve capacity within what was then the Immigration

73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (prohibiting efforts to conceal material facts).
74. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Accused al Shabaab
Leader Charged with Providing Material Support to al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula 3 (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July11/
warsameindictmentpr.pdf (describing the indictment).
75. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2001) (“American criminal law, federal and state, is very broad; it covers far more
conduct than any jurisdiction could possibly punish.”).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Arnaout, 282 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (discussing
a plea agreement to wire-fraud charges after material-support charges were dropped).
77. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2011) (describing a
terrorism-related sentencing enhancement).
78. Unlike in the United Kingdom, technological restraints are not used as substitutes for
detention in the security context. Compare Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J.
1321, 1328–45 (2008) (discussing such restraints), with Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. AF,
[2010] A.C. 2 (H.L.) [64] (appeal taken from Eng.) (establishing a balancing test to determine
whether detainees have the right to information about the reasons for their detention).
79. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1 & n.2 (2003),
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf; see also Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99 n.7 (D.D.C. 2002) (“On November 5, 2001, [the
Department of Justice] indicated that 1,182 people had been detained.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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and Naturalization Service as well as by a series of regulatory
changes. These regulatory changes included loosening the
requirement that immigration detainees be charged within forty-eight
80
hours of their arrest and expanding the use of closed deportation
81
hearings. The immigration-detention power has not been applied as
extensively since 2002, but the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has developed a supplemental suite of terrorism-related tools
to integrate into routine immigration law enforcement. These tools
include a targeting of general enforcement resources toward certain
82
nationalities, a “voluntary” program of call-in interviews that has led
83
to 3216 noncitizens’ being questioned on national-security matters,
and a tracking-and-registration program that requires nationals of
twenty-five majority-Muslim countries to register their entries and
84
exits and report for periodic interviews.
The relative desuetude of emergency-detention powers does not
mean that immigration powers have run their course as
counterterrorism tools. To the contrary, tools developed after 2001
85
remain on the rack for later use. In April 2011, the DHS announced
the termination of its tracking-and-registration program but
cautioned that “the underlying . . . regulation . . . remain[s] in place in
80. See Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d)
(2011) (providing an exception to the forty-eight-hour requirement for “emergenc[ies] or other
extraordinary circumstance[s]”). These expansions of immigration powers allow the negative
inference that there was unused legal authority and institutional capacity within the immigration
system before September 2001.
81. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigration
Judges & Court Adm’rs 4 (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.cnss.org/creppy%20memo
.pdf.
82. Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Comm’r,
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dir., U.S. Marshals
Serv., & U.S. Attorneys 1 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/
abscndr012502mem.pdf.
83. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-459, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO
INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03459.pdf.
84. The National Security Entry and Exit Registration System (NSEERS) was initially
applied only to nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria, but was extended through three
subsequent regulations. See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated
Countries, 68 Fed. Reg. 2363, 2364 (Jan. 16, 2003) (enumerating previous iterations of the
policy).
85. For examples of post-9/11 regulatory changes that remain in effect, see, for example, 8
C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2011) (allowing noncitizens to be arrested without being charged, provided
that an immigration charge is lodged within a “reasonable period of time”); and id.
§ 10003.19(i)(2) (allowing for automatic stays of release orders when immigration authorities
appeal a grant of release on bond).
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the event a special registration program is needed again.”
Constitutional constraints on the conscription of immigration law as
an emergency-detention power are also weak. In two cases in 2001
and 2003, respectively, the Supreme Court endorsed limited
postadjudicative detention of noncitizens deemed removable and
preadjudicative detention in the absence of individualized bond
87
determinations. Since then, a majority of the Court has expressed
“no surprise” that security-related immigration measures have “a
88
disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims.” Such implicit
endorsement of disparate impact, coupled with the Court’s default
89
reluctance to probe officials’ motives, eliminates most equalityrelated constraints on the use of immigration powers.
Unlike immigration powers, the federal courts’ authority to
detain witnesses with “material” evidence related to a “criminal
proceeding” extends across citizenship boundaries and might
90
conceivably be applied extraterritorially. After September 2001, it
was used to detain at least seventy persons in alleged relation to
91
Developing
criminal trials or grand-jury investigations.
jurisprudence casts some doubt on the breadth of material-witness

86. Letter from Margo Schlanger, Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., to Colleagues (Apr. 27, 2011) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
87. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court endorsed the detention for up to
six months of an alien found deportable, id. at 705, whereas in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510
(2003), the Court authorized preadjudication detention without individualized determinations
of flight risk, id. at 557–58.
88. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937, 1951 (2009).
89. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2011) (stating, in a challenge to the
allegedly racially discriminatory use of the material-witness statute, that the Court “has almost
uniformly rejected invitations to probe subjective intent,” and declining to do so in that case).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006) (stating that “the testimony of a person is material in a
criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence
of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person”); cf. Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (granting like power). Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, “[a] witness . . . detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3144 [2006] may request to be deposed
by filing a written motion and giving notice to the parties,” after which the court “may discharge
the witness.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15. There is no obvious reason that Ahmed Warsame, for example,
could not have been held as a material witness for some period of time, perhaps in relation to
criminal cases against other members of al Qaeda.
91. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE
MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 1–5 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2005/us0605/us0605.pdf; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 52–60 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding that the material-witness power extends to grand juries as well as criminal trials).
In Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), the material-witness statute was applied to a U.S.
citizen. Although I am not aware of any extraterritorial use of the statute, no clear reason
suggests that it could not be used extraterritorially.
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detention for future national-security ends. Hearing a Fourth
Amendment challenge in 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that allegations of pretextual use of the material-witness
statute could be sufficient to overcome the qualified immunity of
92
cabinet-level officials. But four Justices expressed concerns about
what Justice Kennedy framed as the question of “when material
witness arrests might be consistent with statutory and constitutional
93
requirements.”
C. Military Commissions
In November 2001, President Bush established unusual
adjudicative bodies called military commissions and vested them with
trial jurisdiction over noncitizen members of al Qaeda and others who
had “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have
caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or
94
adverse effects on the United States.” Proceedings were slow to
95
begin. In June 2006, after a desultory number of commission
hearings, the Supreme Court invalidated the president’s executive
order authorizing the military commissions on the ground that it
exceeded the limited statutory authority for such commissions in the
96
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Congress responded in 2006 with
a new legislative authorization for the commissions, albeit one that
97
contained more robust procedural protections for defendants. In
2009, Congress followed up with further rules that were even more

92. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079, 2085 (dismissing the petitioner’s action under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) on this basis).
93. Id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual use of a material witness warrant for
preventive detention of an individual whom the Government has no intention of using at trial
is . . . a closer question than the majority’s opinion suggests.”).
94. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918, 919 (2002), reprinted in 10 U.S.C.
app. at 856, 857 (2006).
95. See generally David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil
over the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 147–68 (2008)
(describing the promulgation of rules and initial hearings).
96. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006); see also Glazier, supra note 95, at 173
(listing ongoing proceedings in June 2006).
97. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2010)); see also Robert
Chesney, The Least Worst Venue, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.foreign
policy.com/articles/2011/01/21/the_least_worst_venue (noting “substantially greater” procedural
protections).
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98

hospitable to defendants. The progressive melioration of defendants’
entitlements within the commission structure means that the gap
between criminal procedural rights available in Article III courts and
those of the commissions has diminished. The principal remaining
procedural gaps concern the potential admission of some hearsay
evidence—including, at least potentially, the use of evidence derived
from torture or degrading treatment—and the possible admission of
99
defendants’ involuntary statements.
Like immigration detention under Article III, the militarycommission route is not universally available. The 2009 statute limits
100
commission jurisdiction to any “unprivileged enemy belligerent.”
This category is defined to include persons who are “part of al
101
Qaeda” or who “engaged in hostilities against the United States.”
Congress has further specified that offenses can be tried by
commission only “if . . . committed in the context of and associated
102
with hostilities.” One odd consequence of this jurisdictional rule is
that it forces military prosecutors to provide proof of a defendant’s
connections to a terrorist group in every case, a requirement that a
civilian prosecutor using the tools described in Part I.A would often
not have to satisfy. Somewhat counterintuitively, a military
commission may sometimes require the introduction of more
classified evidence than would a parallel civilian prosecution.
Despite their potential jurisdictional breadth, military
commissions have been used to process only a trivial number of
suspected terrorists. Between 2006 and 2009, only six individuals were
sentenced in the statutory military commissions—four after plea
103
bargains.
Despite this less-than-stellar record, enthusiasm for
commissions is unflagging. In April 2011, under pressure from
Congress, Attorney General Eric Holder referred six more cases
98. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 118-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2574
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (Supp. IV 2010)).
99. See ELSEA, supra note 48, at 10–11, 19–20 (comparing procedural safeguards among
the different courts concerning the right to remain silent and the right to examine adverse
witnesses); see also 10 U.S.C. § 949a (Supp. IV 2010) (granting the secretary of defense the
authority to promulgate procedural rules for the commissions that deviate from general courtsmartial rules, but also constraining such authority).
100. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a).
101. Id. §§ 948a(7)(A), (C), 948c.
102. Id. § 950p(c). The statute further defines hostilities to include “any conflict subject to
the laws of war.” Id. § 948a(9).
103. Carol Rosenberg, Terror Trainer Admits Role in al Qaeda Conspiracy, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 16, 2011, at A4.
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involving alleged high-level al Qaeda leaders and the perpetrators of
104
the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole to military commissions. A June
2011 decision from a military appeals court endorsed the use of
105
material-support offenses in a military context. If upheld on appeal,
this ruling would mean that the substance of military-commission
jurisdiction and criminal terrorism prosecution would be close to
106
coextensive in some ways.
D. Military Detention of Enemy Combatants
In contrast to its sparing use of military commissions, the
government initially relied heavily on military detention under the
107
September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).
Until 2008, AUMF-related detentions of so-called enemy combatants
108
were conducted without judicial process. Many military detainees
109
were held at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. From 2002
to 2004, it is unclear whether detainees obtained meaningful judicial
process beyond what was accorded on the battlefield. In 2004, when
judicial review appeared imminent, the military began convening
internal hearings called “Combatant Status Review Tribunals”
110
(CSRTs) to review individual cases. By then, Guantánamo had

104. Holder, supra note 54 (listing five referrals); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD
Announces Charges Sworn Against Detainee Nashiri (Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://www.
defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14424.
105. Defendants convicted under the 2006 military-commissions statute on material-support
grounds challenged their convictions by arguing that the law of war contained no such offense.
In June 2011, the en banc United States Court of Military Commission Review—issuing its very
first opinion—rejected those arguments, drawing on evidence of the criminalization of
analogous conduct through international conventions and by international criminal tribunals.
United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1312–13 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2011); see also
United States v. Al Bahlul, No. CMCR 09-001, 2011 WL 4916373, at *38 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev.
Sept. 9, 2011) (upholding a second conviction on material-support grounds).
106. Military commissions, like civilian criminal trials, allow for the death penalty. Carol
Rosenberg, No Plans Yet for Detainee Executions, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 11, 2011, at A5.
107. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). See generally Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2010) (summarizing the history of Guantánamo detentions).
108. The first adjudication on the merits of the status of a Guantánamo detainee was in
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
109. A global network of other facilities also existed. For a useful survey, see JONATHAN
HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW GLOBAL DETENTION
SYSTEM 31–45 (2010).
110. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf
(relaying an “Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal”). The Wolfowitz

HUQ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1440

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/20/2012 12:33 AM

[Vol. 61:1415

already attracted much public criticism, and the Supreme Court had
issued opinions that allowed detainees there to bring habeas corpus
111
challenges to their detentions. The establishment of CSRTs did not
stanch criticism. To the contrary, criticism continued on the ground
that the CSRTs had been organized to produce the results that
112
government officials sought ex ante. Since 2008, pursuant to
procedural rules crafted by the district courts, litigation has
proceeded in Washington, D.C., federal courts respecting the legality
113
of those detentions.
The extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction to Guantánamo and
a plethora of challenges in the lower courts have not, however,
meaningfully changed patterns of detentions at the Cuban base in the
114
way some hoped and others feared. In the aggregate, 779 people
have been detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, of whom 600
115
have been released. That is, military detention—at least outside the
formal theaters of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan—has not been as
numerically significant as Article III criminal prosecutions, even if it
has received much more media attention. Figure 2 illustrates

memorandum was a preemptive response to the possibility of judicial review created by Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
111. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that detainees at the Cuban base could employ
statutory habeas jurisdiction to challenge the lawfulness of their detentions. 542 U.S. at 480. In
2005 and 2006, Congress attempted to extinguish that jurisdiction, only to have the Court reject
those efforts on Suspension Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, grounds. Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
112. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantanamo: The Boumediene
Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 43 (noting the concern that CSRTs were organized to produce
specific results); see also Reply to Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Al Odah v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007) (mem.) (No. 06-1196), 2007 WL 922261, at *2 (arguing that
“[a]ny review process . . . that limits the court to determining whether the jailor has followed its
own rules, and precludes an inquiry into whether the rules themselves are adequate and more
than an empty shell, cannot be an adequate or effective substitute for habeas”).
113. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442 (TFH), Civil Action Nos.
02-cv-0828 et al., 2008 WL 4858241 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (setting out the procedural
framework for the litigation), amended by Zadran v. Bush, Civil No. 05-CV-2367 (RWR), 2009
WL 498083 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2009).
114. Huq, supra note 107, at 402–04. The fruitlessness of judicial review is unlikely to change
soon. One judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—which has
become the de facto final court of review in detainee cases—has cautioned that, whatever legal
standards are used, he “doubt[ed] any of [his] colleagues [would] vote to grant a petition if he or
she believe[d] that it [were] somewhat likely that the petitioner [was] an al Qaeda adherent or
an active supporter.” Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J.,
concurring).
115. The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last
updated Feb. 15, 2012).
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Guantánamo’s changing population. Like criminal and immigration
law, military detention saw its greatest use in 2002 and experienced a
decline in popularity thereafter.
116

Figure 2. Number of Prisoners Reported at Guantánamo

Although courts have not changed the aggregate dynamics of
military detention, politics has. In January 2009, President Obama
promulgated an executive order that envisaged an eventual end to
117
detention operations at Guantánamo. Political opposition to his
proposal was distilled into appropriations riders that prohibited
118
transfers of prisoners from the base. And Obama’s meliorist
procedural changes, such as a new system of periodic internal review,
119
have had scant impact on the release rate so far.
116. This chart reports biannual changes in the Guantánamo detainee population based on
Pentagon press statements. That is, I have taken Pentagon statements from the beginning and
the middle of each calendar year—or as close as are available—and reported the detainee
population on these dates. For more details on data, including sources and more detailed
reporting of the same data, see Huq, supra note 107, at 402–04.
117. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203, 203 (2010).
118. See, e.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L.
No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (prohibiting the expenditure of Pentagon funds on
detainee transfers); Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103, 123
Stat. 1859, 1920 (same). See generally Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, How the White House
Lost on Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2011, at A1 (describing efforts in Congress to
oppose detainee transfer).
119. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277, 13,277–79 (Mar. 7, 2011) (establishing
“Periodic Review Board[s]” to conduct counseled annual status hearings). Since Congress has
prohibited transfers from the base, see supra note 118 and accompanying text, the executive
order has not had any effect on releases.
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The future substantive breadth of military detention is not clear.
It is settled that the AUMF allows detention of both citizens and
120
noncitizens. Some circuit court precedent also endorses detention of
121
Since March 2009, the
citizens seized in the United States.
Department of Justice has argued that it is lawful to detain
persons that the President determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, . . . persons who harbored those responsible for
those attacks[, and] . . . persons who were part of, or substantially
supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
122
partners.

That definition was reiterated in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA), which “affirm[ed]” the
executive’s authority to detain, inter alia, persons “who planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks and
anyone who “was a part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities in aid of
123
such enemy forces.” The “substantially supported” language of the
2012 NDAA creates broad latitude for military detention. Before the

120. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–19 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Congress has
in fact authorized [a citizen’s] detention, through the AUMF.”).
121. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 393–95 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the AUMF
authorizes the president to detain a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant even if the citizen is
arrested on U.S. soil).
122. Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting
Respondent’s Revised Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 3, In Re: Guantanamo Bay Litigation, 613 F.
Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009) (Nos. 05-1347 (GK), 05-1601 (GK), OS-1678 (GK), and 06-1684
(GK)), ECF No. 174).
123. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 2012), Pub. L. No.
112-81, § 1021(b)(1)–(2) (2011), PL 112-81 (Westlaw). The provision goes on to disclaim any
attempt “to limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for
Use of Military Force” or to “affect existing laws or authorities relating to the detention of
United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are
captured or arrested in the United States.” Id. § 1021(d)–(e). There is an obvious puzzle as to
how these caveats can be squared with the statute’s new definition of military-detention
authority. One way of reconciling the different parts of the statute is to observe that Congress
basically codified the judiciary’s construction of the 2001 AUMF as applied to overseas captures
and detentions, including judges’ reliance on “the law of war,” id. § 1021(c), while leaving open
those question that have divided federal courts, such as the scope of military-detention authority
in the United States. This was not the only proposed change to detention authority. See, e.g.,
Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, S. 3081, 111th Cong.
§ 5 (2010) (proposing expansion of the enemy combatant category to include citizens).
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2012 NDAA’s enactment, the D.C. Circuit suggested that it would
124
accept even more ambitious claims of detention authority. The D.C.
Circuit also suggested that it would demand only a preponderance of
the evidence to uphold the government’s decisions to detain
125
suspects.
*

*

*

In sum, the government’s choice set with respect to terrorist
detention can be separated into the four quadrants illustrated in
Table 1 for the purpose of analysis. Empirical data suggests that
Article III criminal prosecution has been the workhorse, although
military detention of enemy combatants frequently has been used.
Overall, the volume of detention has declined as 9/11 has receded in
time.
II. THE UBIQUITY OF JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY
Part I emphasizes the heterogeneity of long-term terroristdetention options. This Part identifies jurisdictional redundancy as a
common thread weaving together those multiple pathways of terrorist
detention.
A. Defining Jurisdictional Redundancy
As used in this Article, the term “jurisdictional redundancy”
refers to the government’s option to subject the same individual to
two or more different adjudicative venues for the purpose of
determining the legality of continued detention. I also assume here
that forums behave independently of each other. It is a sign of
redundancy that the government must decide which of multiple
126
venues to use to adjudicate the status of a suspected terrorist.
124. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (suggesting that the
AUMF allows the detention of any person who can be tried in a military commission); see also
Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (suggesting that anyone who
“purposefully and materially support[s]” al Qaeda can be detained); accord Hatim v. Gates, 632
F.3d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Case law in the D.C. Circuit defining the scope of
AUMF-related detention has basically ignored the Fourth Circuit’s holdings in Padilla v. Hanft,
423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), and Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007).
125. E.g., Uthman, 637 F.3d at 403 n.3; Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
126. This is not the only way to define overlap, but it is the definition most useful in the
context. For instance, Professors Sah and Stiglitz distinguish between polyarchies, in which
there are several competing decisionmakers, and hierarchies. Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 23, at
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Redundancy can take two forms: simultaneous or sequential. First,
two jurisdictional pathways can be simultaneous substitutes, such that
the government must opt between them. For example, press reports
suggested that when the government identified a group of suspected
terrorists in Lackawanna, New York, in 2002, senior policymakers
deliberated as to whether to channel them into the criminal-justice
system or the military-detention system before the suspects had been
128
arrested.
Second, jurisdictional pathways can be sequential
complements. In those situations, the government has the choice to
use a second forum once a first adjudication comes to an unsuccessful
close. Thus, if the initial forum does not yield the outcome sought by
the government, government officials retain the option of switching to
another jurisdictional pathway. Although I discuss some examples in
the next Section, notice that if one of the Lackawanna suspects had
been acquitted, the government might have invoked sequential
redundancy by switching the suspect into military detention.
Jurisdictional redundancy requires the government to have at its
disposal multiple institutions capable of undertaking similar
adjudicative functions. This requirement suggests that at any given
time there is reserve capacity in the overall system that can be tapped
129
even if it is not continuously in use. Stated differently, the use of
jurisdictional redundancy suggests that the government has the power
either to expand the use of existing forums or to create new ones to
address emergent exigencies.
B. Examples of Jurisdictional Redundancy
Jurisdictional redundancy is a pervasive feature of the
government’s choice set in dealing with a terrorist suspect. The
ubiquity of jurisdictional redundancy can be documented by
716. The design choices in this adjudicative context do not exactly map onto these categories,
but they are similar.
127. See Allan W. Lerner, There Is More than One Way To Be Redundant: A Comparison of
Alternatives for the Design and Use of Redundancy in Organizations, 18 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 334,
336 (1986) (offering a typology of redundant institutional-design choices and comparing their
advantages and disadvantages).
128. Michael Powell, No Choice but Guilty, WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at A1 (describing
how Article III criminal prosecution was chosen).
129. Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap,
29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346, 349 (1969) (characterizing redundancy as the addition of “reserve
power” that can act as a “safety-factor”). Not all forms of overlap lead to redundancy of this
kind: it is possible to describe a mandatory hierarchical structure, such as a trial proceeding
followed by a mandatory appeal, as containing redundancy. Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 23, at 716.
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cataloging cases in which suspects have been moved from one
jurisdictional channel to another—cases involving the sequential use
of two forums. In all of these cases, it is worth emphasizing that the
government had an initial choice between pathways as
contemporaneous substitutes. Although this choice is implicit in the
structure of the law, in most instances, no extrinsic evidence of active
consideration of the various options is publicly available because of
classification rules.
1. From Article III Criminal Proceedings to Immigration Removal
Proceedings. Immigration authority has been invoked when a
criminal prosecution against a noncitizen fails to produce a conviction
and double-jeopardy rules preclude criminal retrial. Haitian national
Lyglenson Lemorin, for example, was arrested based on allegations
that he and five other members of a Moorish Science Temple sect had
conspired to attack the Willis Tower in Chicago and various Federal
130
Bureau of Investigation buildings nationally. After he was acquitted
of criminal charges, Lemorin was placed in removal proceedings and
131
then deported based on substantially the same factual allegations.
But the government does not always prevail in a second and
subsequent proceeding of this sort. In another case, a University of
South Florida student was charged with transporting explosives after
132
being arrested with model-rocket propellant. After being acquitted
of a material-support offense, the student was placed in deportation
133
proceedings but ultimately was found not deportable.
2. From Immigration Detention to Article III Criminal
Proceedings. When immigration powers are employed as a first130. After two mistrials, Lemorin’s five codefendants were convicted in 2009. Vanessa
Blum, 5 of Liberty City 6 Guilty, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 2009, § 1, at 14. News reports refer to the
Sears Tower, which has since been renamed.
131. See Lemorin v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 416 Fed. App’x 35, 38–39 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (finding Lemorin removable); Jay Weaver & Jacqueline Charles, Virtual Hookup
Connects Grieving Haitian Father to Miami Family, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 16, 2011, at B4
(“Although Lemorin was acquitted, immigration authorities still deemed him a ‘national
security’ threat under the U.S. Patriot Act passed after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.”).
132. Jay Weaver, ‘Double Jeopardy’ for Accused, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 31, 2009, at B1.
133. Id. Another possible interaction between the criminal and immigration systems arises
when deportation is part of a plea agreement. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Former Fla. Professor
To Be Deported, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at A3 (“Former Florida professor Sami al-Arian
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to provide support to a Palestinian terrorist
organization and agreed to be deported from the United States in a deal with federal
prosecutors . . . .”).
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round response to a security emergency, a downstream method of
dealing with those detained is Article III criminal prosecution. Given
how well suited immigration powers might seem for pretextual
temporary detention—at least of noncitizens—it is perhaps surprising
how infrequently such pretextual detention occurs. After the
immigration roundups that followed the September 2001 attacks, civil
removal proceedings tended to be the principal alternative to release,
and a June 2003 Department of Justice investigation into the
detentions identified only twelve cases in which an immigration
134
detainee had been charged criminally.
3. From Article III Criminal Proceedings to Enemy-Combatant
Detention or Military-Commission Jurisdiction. Persons originally
seized in the United States on suspicion of terrorism were later
detained as enemy combatants in only two cases. In both cases, the
suspects, U.S. citizen José Padilla and Qatari national Ali Salah alMarri, were initially held in the criminal-justice system. Upon his
arrival at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago, Padilla was first
detained as a material witness in anticipation of an indictment but
was then transferred into military custody as an “enemy
135
combatant.” Similarly, after his arrest in Peoria, Illinois, al-Marri
was subject to multiple, superseding federal indictments, first in
Illinois and then in New York, before being designated an “enemy
combatant.” Following this designation, the indictment against him
136
was dismissed with prejudice. As of 2012, the Padilla and al-Marri
cases were outliers. Nevertheless, the government has the option, at
least on paper, to follow the precedent set by those cases. Operative
precedent in the five states that make up the Fourth Circuit permits
the government to detain citizens, at least in some circumstances, as
137
enemy combatants even within the United States.

134. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 79, at 30.
135. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426
(2004).
136. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 165 (4th Cir. 2007) (recounting the charging history
and dismissal). The author of this Article was counsel to al-Marri.
137. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding, by analogy to the
facts in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion), that Padilla’s detention was
authorized). Depending on which facts in Padilla are emphasized, the opinion might be read to
apply narrowly to a small class of cases in which a suspect arrives after having been on a foreign
battlefield, or broadly, whenever someone enters the United States with instructions from a
proscribed terrorist organization.
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A variant on this move is the shift from Article III indictments to
charges before a military commission. The so-called 9/11
coconspirators were initially indicted in the Southern District of New
York. In April 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder filed a nolle
prosequi motion seeking dismissal of those indictments in light of
legislative restrictions on transfers of Guantánamo detainees for trial
138
in federal court. In effect, the five detainees covered by his motion
were plucked out of pending Article III criminal adjudication with the
expectation that they would eventually be placed into militarycommission proceedings. The potential for such transfers was
amplified by a June 2011 ruling from the U.S. Court of Military
Commission Review that the offense of material support, although
never charged previously in a war-crimes tribunal, furnished a lawful
ground for a military conviction under Congress’s power to define
139
and punish offenses against the law of nations. That ruling, although
subject to appeal to the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, is
significant because it diminished the possibility that members of al
Qaeda who are alleged to have participated indirectly in the 9/11
attacks, but not traditional military operations, will be found to be
beyond military-commission jurisdiction.
4. From Enemy-Combatant Detention or Military-Commission
Jurisdiction to Article III Criminal Proceedings. The border between
Article III criminal jurisdiction and military jurisdiction is permeable
in both directions. After being classified as enemy combatants seized
in the United States, Padilla and al-Marri both left military detention
140
only upon indictment in federal court. Although al-Marri pled guilty
to material-support charges, Padilla stood trial and was convicted of
offenses related to a conspiracy to provide support for jihad in places
outside the United States, such as Kosovo and Chechnya, throughout
141
the 1990s. From 2009 to 2010, the Obama administration appeared
138. United States v. Mohammed, No. (S14) 93 Cr. 180 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011),
available at https://webspace.utexas.edu/rmc2289/Nolle%20and%20Unsealing%20Order%20%204-4-11.pdf.
139. United States v. Hamdan, No. CMCR 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *15 (Ct. Mil.
Comm’n Rev. June 24, 2011).
140. Al-Marri was charged on both material-support and conspiracy counts. Indictment,
United States v. Al-Marri, No. 09-CR-10030 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/topics/budget/al-Marri.pdf.
141. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584–85 (4th Cir. 2005). Padilla was later found guilty on
all counts. United States v. Hassoun, No. 0:04-cr-60001-MGC, 2007 WL 2349148 (S.D. Fla. Aug.
16, 2007).
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poised to transfer a significant tranche of Guantánamo detainees to
the continental United States for trial in federal court. Legislative and
popular opposition, however, induced the Obama administration to
142
change course. Only one detainee, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani of
Tanzania, was eventually transferred from Cuba for an Article III
143
criminal trial.
It is also worth noting that a detainee can be exposed to militarycommission jurisdiction and then shifted to enemy-combatant
detention. Hence, the Supreme Court emphasized in the course of
invalidating military commissions created by presidential order that
dismissal of a commission proceeding did not impinge on the
144
military’s authority to hold a detainee as an enemy combatant. In
subsequent military-commission proceedings, the government has
conspicuously emphasized its authority to continue holding even
145
those defendants acquitted by the tribunals.
5. From Military Detention to Immigration Proceedings. A
noncitizen detained as an enemy combatant has never been exposed
later to immigration proceedings. But one case—Yaser Hamdi’s—is a
variant on this possibility. Hamdi, a U.S. citizen suspected of having
fought for the Taliban in Afghanistan, initially was held in military
detention as an enemy combatant. As part of his release agreement,
he agreed to be stripped of citizenship and removed from the United

142. Finn & Kornblut, supra note 118.
143. Ghailani was convicted on one count of conspiring to destroy buildings and property of
the United States and acquitted on 248 other counts. United States v. Ghailani, 761 F. Supp. 2d
167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting a postconviction challenge based on sufficiency of the
evidence).
144. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (“It bears emphasizing that Hamdan
does not challenge, and we do not today address, the Government’s power to detain him for the
duration of active hostilities in order to prevent such harm.”).
145. See, e.g., Government Response to Defense Motion for Appropriate Relief To
Determine if the Trial of This Case Is One from Which the Defendant May Be Meaningfully
Acquitted at 6, United States v. Hussayn (Mil. Comm’n Oct. 27, 2011) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (“Should the accused be acquitted following a trial by military commission, the
government could, as a legal matter, continue to detain the accused during hostilities . . . .”).
This has the odd consequence of eliminating defendants’ incentives to participate in militarycommission proceedings. If military detention can continue after acquittal, it follows a fortiori
that it can continue after the end of a commission sentence. Hence, the fact of being sentenced
vel non may have no impact on a defendant’s expected liberty. Even from the government’s
perspective, there is something perverse about this situation. In effect, the only social value of a
relatively expensive and time-consuming commission proceeding may be symbolic, since it has
no necessary effect on the duration of detention. Under these conditions, there is a legitimate
question whether noncapital commissions have social value at all.
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146

States. In effect, Hamdi traded military detention for expulsion and
permanent exile from the United States.
C. Legal Barriers to Jurisdictional Redundancy
Both simultaneous and sequential forms of redundancy can arise
only if legal obstacles to the availability of alternative jurisdictional
pathways are dismantled. Three potential legal obstacles exist. None
is robust. Rather, counterterrorism legal doctrine is structured so as
to allow redundancy.
A first barrier to redundancy might be found in the Fifth
147
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. It is possible to imagine an
expansion of that rule to preclude a second government effort to
adjudicate terrorist status in a different forum. But in cases in which a
previous federal criminal adjudication has occurred, courts have
declined to find a double-jeopardy bar to subsequent federal
immigration proceedings even if the first trial concerned the same
148
primary conduct as the second. The same would likely hold true if
an Article III proceeding were to be followed by enemy-combatant
detention. There also seems to be no bar under double-jeopardy
principles to employing military detention even after a prosecution—
whether civilian or military—has reached a final result that
149
dissatisfies the government.
A variant on the double-jeopardy problem has arisen in cases in
which detainees, such as Ali Salah al-Marri, were moved from the
Article III criminal process to a military system after indictment. In
those cases, the government has had to accept dismissal of an initial
150
indictment with prejudice as the cost of transfer. This means that
offenses included in the first indictment are no longer available

146. Motion of Defendant To Stay Proceedings at 8, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02CV439
(E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2004).
147. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
148. See, e.g., Lemorin v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 416 Fed. App’x 35, 40 (11th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (rejecting the double-jeopardy argument against the use of immigration powers after
criminal process). In some cases, counsel’s failure to advise a criminal defendant of the
“automatic” immigration consequences of a plea agreement may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478,
1483 (2010).
149. See sources cited supra notes 144–45.
150. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 674–75 (D.S.C. 2005) (noting dismissal
with prejudice).
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151

against the same defendant. Any such dilemma was evaded in alMarri’s case because the first indictment charged fraud-related
offenses, whereas the later indictment charged material-support
152
offenses. In other words, the breadth and redundancy of existing
criminal law may mitigate the barrier imposed by prejudicial dismissal
153
of a threshold indictment.
Like other criminal-procedure
entitlements, double-jeopardy protection has been effectively sapped
by prosecutors’ growing ability to leverage the growing breadth of
154
substantive criminal law.
Double jeopardy might have more bite when a military
commission is employed after a defendant has been acquitted in an
Article III criminal proceeding. But its application is unclear even in
those situations. Although the statutory protection against retrial in a
155
military commission is ambiguous,
ordinary double-jeopardy
principles at least suggest that a second trial by the same sovereign
156
would be prohibited. The issue, however, has never been litigated,
and its ultimate resolution is not free from doubt. It is not clear, for
example, whether Fifth Amendment protections shelter noncitizens
at Guantánamo, where the military commissions are currently
located. D.C. Circuit precedent suggests that that tribunal will be
157
inhospitable to such constitutional claims. It is thus likely that the

151. Cf. United States v. Welborn, 849 F.2d 980, 983–84 (5th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing the
effect of a dismissal with prejudice from that of a dismissal without prejudice). The prejudicial
effect of an earlier dismissal is distinct from double-jeopardy concerns. See United States v.
Terry, 5 F.3d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The government contends that [the defendant] waived
any jeopardy contention he may have had by acquiescing in the [FED. R. CIV. P.] 48(a)
dismissal . . . . This dismissal did not bar retrial.”).
152. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 51 at 57 n.19 (describing both indictments and
listing charges).
153. See Brown, supra note 25, at 230 (discussing redundancy in the criminal law).
154. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 72, at 592 (noting the expansion of prosecutorial
power “whenever . . . multiple criminal offenses can be charged . . . and . . . the difference
between the potential sentence for the potential top count and the sentence available for lesser
charges is substantial”); id. at 618–24 (discussing the use of “pretextual” charges in terrorism
cases).
155. The military-commissions statute provides that “[n]o person may, without his consent,
be tried by a military commission under this chapter a second time for the same offense.” 10
U.S.C. § 949h (2006). This provision is ambiguous because it might apply when the first
adjudication was before a military commission, but not when the first adjudication was before
an Article III court.
156. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197 (2004) (explaining the separate-sovereign
requirement of double-jeopardy protection).
157. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he law of this
circuit . . . holds that the Fifth Amendment does not extend to aliens or foreign entities without
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government would be able to construe the military-commission
statute as permitting relitigation of charges that have already been
158
rejected by an Article III court or jury.
The second potential legal barrier pertains to physical or
psychological mistreatment in the first forum. Criminal defendants
have unsuccessfully asked courts to treat prolonged military
detention, allegations of torture, or evidence of other forms of
mistreatment during military or CIA custody as a bar to further
adjudication. Ahmed Ghailani, the Tanzanian al Qaeda member
alleged to have participated in the 1996 bombings in Nairobi and Dares-Salaam, argued that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy
trial precluded criminal prosecution after a five-year detention in
159
CIA and military custody. The district court disagreed, although it
distinguished between CIA detention and detention in military
custody, holding that only the latter counted toward the speedy-trial
160
clock. Ghailani also contended that his alleged torture while in CIA
custody had been “so fundamentally unfair” that his indictment
161
The district court also rejected that
should be dismissed.
162
argument. Similar efforts by enemy combatants to turn their
treatment in military custody into a shield against future prosecution
163
have been rebuffed.

presence or property in the United States.”). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277
(2008) (holding that the Suspension Clause extends to the Cuban base). Rasul, however, did not
concern private litigants who had at one point been in the United States and then had been
moved to Guantánamo, a fact that might change the analysis.
158. Moreover, some evidence exists to show that the government takes the position that
double-jeopardy protection does not prevent a person acquitted in an Article III criminal
proceeding from being retried in a court-martial. See Nicholas Schmidle, Three Trials for
Murder: In the Name of Justice, Did the Military Sidestep Double Jeopardy?, NEW YORKER,
Nov. 14, 2011, at 56 (recounting one such case).
159. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 515, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
160. Id. at 554–59; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972) (setting forth a fourpart balancing test for violations to the right to a speedy trial). In applying this analysis, the
Court has endorsed delays of up to 7.5 years, suggesting that speedy-trial restraints are weak.
See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315–17 (1986) (holding that the defendant
had failed to bear the “heavy burden of showing an unreasonable delay” necessary to support
his speedy-trial claim). The district court’s holding creates an odd and perhaps undesirable
incentive for the government to resort to CIA detention in lieu of military detention when it
wishes to employ the criminal process subsequently.
161. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 1079090, at *2–6 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 9, 2007) (rejecting a detainee’s motion to dismiss a federal indictment based upon the
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Third, the Constitution might impose limits on jurisdictional
redundancy by mandating the use of an Article III forum in a certain
class of cases. The debate on this issue has focused on the border
between Article III criminal jurisdiction and various forms of military
164
jurisdiction in cases that arise within the United States. Yet courts
have found it difficult to limn the boundary between Article III and
military jurisdiction with precision. The Constitution’s criminalprocedure rules are silent as to their zone of application. Textual
arguments for limiting military jurisdiction are hence elusive.
Moreover, the Supreme Court historically has seemed of two minds
about limiting military jurisdiction. Some precedent seems to prohibit
the use of military jurisdiction within the territory of the United
States absent active hostilities, whereas other cases seem to endorse
165
such a measure.
Lower courts have drawn inconsistent and
166
incompatible lessons from this precedent. Nor has the Supreme
Court evinced any inclination to settle the matter. During the 2000s,
the Supreme Court passed up three opportunities to provide a
definitive gloss on the AUMF’s application within the United
167
States. It seems unlikely that the Court will take up the issue any
time soon. Thus, the boundaries between jurisdictional pathways are
likely to remain unsettled.

claim that he had been subjected to outrageous government conduct while in the custody of the
military authorities so as to make his continued federal prosecution a violation of due process).
164. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J.,
concurring) (developing an argument that some detentions in the United States must be
accomplished by civilian, and not military, process), vacated as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v.
Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
165. Compare Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 136 (1866) (purporting to limit military
jurisdiction within the United States when civilian tribunals are open), with Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (allowing the exercise of military jurisdiction over a citizen seized within the
United States). The permissible scope of martial law is another question that has not been
settled. Compare Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (narrowly reading the
authorization of wartime martial law in Hawaii), with Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909)
(broadly endorsing the use of martial law).
166. For example, in the most recent merits consideration of the substantive law of domestic
military detention, the en banc Fourth Circuit fragmented into seven separate opinions with no
clear majority holding on the scope of appropriate detention authority. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at
216.
167. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (declining to define the limits of
permissible detention authority); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 450–51 (2004) (declining to
rule on the merits of an enemy-combatant detention); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1
(2004) (plurality opinion) (noting that “the permissible bounds of the [enemy-combatant]
category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to them”).
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It is not simply that the law does not limit redundancy. Relevant
statutory frameworks aid and abet it. The legislative framework for
counterterrorism, for example, ensures a common focus on specific
organizations. Congress has established a single mechanism for
168
designating “foreign terrorism organizations” (FTOs). Pursuant to
this mechanism, the secretary of state had designated forty-nine
169
entities as of early 2012, including al Qaeda and the Taliban. FTO
status establishes an element of both the crime of material support
170
and grounds for security-related deportation. Both al Qaeda and
the Taliban are also organizations encompassed by the September
2001 AUMF. Their members, as well as some domain of affiliates, can
171
be tried before a military commission—if they are noncitizens —and
detained as enemy combatants—perhaps regardless of their
citizenship. All four jurisdictional pathways in Table 1 thus share a
common factual element in terms of the particular entities Congress
has singled out as terrorist organizations. Untangling the role of FTO
designation across these systems would be costly and would entail
simultaneous reworking of multiple regulatory frameworks. For this
reason, FTO designation likely will remain a pivotal cog in the
machinery of counterterrorism law, thereby promoting jurisdictional
redundancy.
Redundancy also is fostered by a growing convergence on the
scope of primary conduct that permits detention. Courts in both
civilian and military contexts have drawn a line between behavior that
is coordinated with a designated entity—which can trigger
detention—and behavior that is independent of such an entity—which
cannot. On the civilian side, the Supreme Court has read the
material-support statute to criminalize conduct coordinated with a
designated entity, but not conduct undertaken independent of that
172
entity. Glossing the AUMF, the D.C. Circuit has sketched a similar
168. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4) (2006) (granting the secretary of state, in consultation
with the secretary of the treasury and the attorney general, authority to designate an
organization an FTO upon finding that it is foreign, engages in “terrorist activity” or
“terrorism,” and thereby “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national
security of the United States”).
169. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.state
.gov/g/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II). Section 1182(a)(3)(B) contains several other terrorismrelated grounds of deportation.
171. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(1), 948b(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
172. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010). For further
discussion of the line separating coordinated speech from independent speech, see Aziz Z. Huq,
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outer boundary to enemy-combatant detention. In one case, it
distinguished a person who was “part of” al Qaeda—and was hence
amenable to detention—from someone who engaged in the “purely
173
Only
independent conduct of a freelancer”—who was not.
immigration law sweeps more broadly. Title 8 of the U.S. Code
enables the deportation of the “representative[s]” and “member[s]”
174
of a terrorist organization without evidence of any coordinated
action and also directs that the “spouse or child” of any alien found
175
deportable on certain terrorism-related grounds be removed. It is
unclear if this latter provision has ever been used. In practice,
immigration law seems to employ roughly the same boundaries as the
criminal law or enemy-combatant detention.
*

*

*

In sum, changes to the legal framework of terrorist detention in
case law and at least some legislation have trended toward greater
176
redundancy. The overlap among forums for terrorism suspects, as a
result, is pervasive.
III. THE EFFECTS OF JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY ON
TERRORIST-DETENTION POLICY
Jurisdictional redundancy may be ubiquitous, but is it desirable?
Would it be better, as many believe, to channel particular classes of
terrorism suspects instead into a single forum? These questions are
not rhetorical. Commentators and legislators have proposed small
and large changes that would reduce or eliminate swatches of
Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf.
173. Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752–53 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); accord Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720,
721 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)–(V) (2006). At least one court of appeals, ruling on a
different provision of the code, has expressed concerns about the government’s use of “guilt by
association” as a theory of removal. Yusupov v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 650 F.3d 968, 983
(3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the government’s theory as to why a noncitizen was not entitled to the
withholding of removal based on his association with other suspected terrorists and citing
constitutional concerns).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX) (2006) (finding removable “the spouse or child of an
alien who is inadmissible under [the terrorism-related part of the Code], if the activity causing
the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5 years”).
176. One exception to this trend is the imposition of legislated restrictions on transfers from
Guantánamo for criminal prosecution. See supra note 118.
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jurisdictional overlap by channeling suspects into one venue or by
creating a new and exclusive venue tailored to the terrorism
177
context. These proposals reflect a pervasive but largely unexamined
assumption that redundancy is undesirable.
This Part provides a framework for analyzing how jurisdictional
redundancy influences policy outcomes. It focuses on how such
overlap influences, either directly or indirectly, two clumps of values
related to accuracy and cost minimization. By “accuracy,” I mean to
capture a detention system’s ability to reach particularized judgments
as to specific detainees that are factually accurate applications of a
178
governing legal standard. Accordingly, accuracy decreases as either
the rate of false positives or the rate of false negatives increases. By
“cost-minimization,” I mean a residual category of other government
and private expenditures related to the operation of a detention
system. Using these labels, I aim to capture in the analysis not only
transaction costs immediately attendant to the ongoing management
of various forums but also the potential downstream costs of false
negatives and false positives that accrue to government or private
parties. The latter category includes, for example, the cost to detained
individuals of an erroneous deprivation of liberty and the cost to
public safety from an erroneous release decision. By framing the
analysis in terms of accuracy and cost minimization, I aim to tally in
rough form the most important policy gains and losses related to the
operation of a terrorist-detention system.
My analysis focuses on accuracy and cost minimization on the
assumption that these are generally uncontroversial and important
goals. It is, to be sure, possible to posit other goals for a detention
system. Some, for example, might prioritize fairness, individual
constitutional rights, or the rule of law and so demand that legal rules
be publicly and comprehensively specified in advance of their
application. Others might view terrorism as so beyond the pale that
the law should express without reservation the judgment that
terrorists do not deserve the same rights and privileges as common
179
criminals. Either way, the aspirations of detention law would be
starkly normative. Claims about fairness, the rule of law, or

177. See infra Part IV.A–B.
178. My nomenclature is inexact insofar as “accuracy” more precisely means “accuracyrelated costs.” But I prefer inexactitude here to prolixity or verbal infelicity.
179. For a relatively mild statement of this position, see Andrew C. McCarthy, Terrorism on
Trial: The Trials of al Qaeda, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 513, 518 (2004).
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existential threats are not easily translated into analytically tractable
forms. This uncertainty creates a temptation to use such concerns as
trumps to forestall careful analysis. Even if nuanced normative
analysis is possible, large disagreement about first principles means
that such normative questions are not a useful starting point for
policy analysis. Further, many normative qualities are captured in a
consequentialist analysis of errors and costs. It is unclear whether
much is added by recasting these concerns in overtly normative garb.
In short, I take the goal of a terrorist-detention system with a low rate
of errors and a low operating cost to be a plausible first-cut target for
institutional-design analysis on the ground that any more specification
180
of goals would be controversial and analytically opaque.
This Part therefore begins by asking how jurisdictional
redundancy affects accuracy and cost directly in light of existing
jurisdictional
specifications.
Using
existing
jurisdictional
arrangements as a focus for analysis, it first demonstrates that the
relationship of jurisdiction to error rates and costs is surprisingly
complex. Hence, the shift from Article III exclusivity to jurisdictional
plurality since the beginning of the twenty-first century has had more
reticulated effects than have been generally perceived. After
addressing direct effects, I turn to two secondary mechanisms through
which jurisdictional redundancy indirectly influences accuracy and
cost: its influence on agency costs and on information flows.
Together, the analysis of both direct and indirect effects provides a
general framework for analyzing the forum-choice question. This
analysis demonstrates that “[s]pecific institutional arrangements
181
invariably have multiple effects.”
Conventional doctrinal
approaches to the forum-choice question, by contrast, do not account
for plural effects.
Two threshold caveats are important to state here. First, as
should be evident from my specification of policy goals, my analysis
makes only weak assumptions about social welfare and government
incentives. Thus, I assume it is desirable that some persons who pose
some risk of violent harm should be detained on consequentialist
180. One potential concern is that I am stacking the analytic deck, so to speak, by omitting
deontological concerns. But such concerns—much like accuracy and cost-minimization
concerns—can cut strongly in both directions. It is therefore unlikely that a close focus on
consensus-animated goals has a skewing effect on the analysis.
181. PIERSON, supra note 33, at 109; see also ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS:
COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 3–12 (1997) (“In a system, the chains of
consequences extend over time and many areas: The effects of action are always multiple.”).
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grounds. I take no position on the contested and difficult question
of how much risk is necessary to warrant detention. I also assume that
it is undesirable to detain individuals on the false belief that they are
connected to terrorism. I rely on no assumption here about how these
different goals should be weighted or aggregated. At the same time, I
make no assumption that government officials are either well
intentioned, and hence will always and necessarily reduce terrorism
risks without unnecessary costs, or badly intentioned, such that they
are systematically interested in empire building, shirking, or
disregarding constitutional interests. As a matter of naïve empiricism,
I suspect that a mixture of both good and bad types can be found
within existing governments. The analysis instead proceeds from the
perspective of an institution designer working behind something of a
veil of ignorance. From this perspective, it is likely wise to assume
that electoral competition will throw up both good and bad types.
Hence, institutions must be designed with both the best and the worst
183
of times in mind.
Second, a focus on the policy effects of jurisdictional redundancy
is not unprecedented in public law. Overlap has been recognized as a
central problem in both federal jurisdiction and administrative law. In
the federal courts scholarship, the question of redundancy has arisen
in debates about the appropriate scope of federal court collateral
184
review of state court criminal judgments. Scholars such as Professor
Paul Bator and Judge Henry Friendly disagree with Professors
Robert Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff about the costs and
benefits of duplicative federal review of state court criminal
185
processes. Their debate turns on the relative costs and benefits of
182. This is not intended to be a controversial position. Our system of pretrial bail, the
detention of an enemy state’s soldiers in wartime, and the detention of the seriously
psychologically ill are all forms of incapacitation on consequentialist grounds that have wide
support in principle, even if specific applications are controversial.
183. One might counter that electoral incentives will push even bad types to minimize
terrorism risk. But that is not at all clear insofar as terrorism risk has a long duration, with
harms materializing long after the salient actions would need to be taken. As a consequence, a
rational actor may slack off knowing that her successor will pay the political price.
184. Such review is an exercise of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006), as modified by 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2006). See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 & n.4 (1996) (noting that § 2254 “specifies the
conditions under which . . . relief may be granted” when § 2241 jurisdiction is invoked by a state
convict).
185. Compare Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 454 (1963) (arguing that “if one set of institutions has been
granted the task of finding the facts and applying the law and does so in a manner rationally
adapted to the task, in the absence of institutional or functional reasons to the contrary we
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sequential redundancy with a second forum that specializes in federal
186
constitutional questions. Subsequent administrative-law scholars
have recognized the ubiquity of overlap in the federal regulatory
state. This overlap means that responsibility for a policy matter is
187
often shared by multiple agencies. In the courts, judges respond to
the resulting interagency tensions by applying a presumption that
188
Congress assigned law-interpreting authority to one agency alone.
But administrative-law scholars have questioned this approach. They
have developed theories of why Congress might favor jurisdictional
189
redundancy. Their analysis, however, has generally focused on
regulatory, rulemaking jurisdiction, not on the kind of adjudicative

should accept a presumption against mere repetition of the process on the alleged ground that,
after all, error could have occurred”), and Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970) (arguing that “convictions
should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea
with a colorable claim of innocence”), with Cover, supra note 27, at 649–80 (concluding that
“[i]nterest, [i]deology, and [i]nnovation . . . constitute justifications for the jurisdictional
redundancy which characterizes our federalism”), and Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1045 (1977)
(arguing that jurisdictional redundancy “fosters greater certainty that constitutional rights will
not be erroneously denied”). The view of Professor Bator and Judge Friendly largely prevailed.
See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–
108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.
(2006) and FED. R. APP. P. 22) (imposing multiple restrictions on federal habeas review).
186. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 27, at 657 (identifying “[i]nterest, [i]deology, and
[i]nnovation” as relevant effects of jurisdictional overlap).
187. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 28 (enumerating areas of overlap); George Robert
Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA
Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (1987) (identifying workplace and mine safety as
areas of regulatory activity “divided between two wholly separate, independent agencies”).
188. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 153
(1991) (“[W]e presume . . . that Congress intended to invest interpretive power in the
administrative actor in the best position to develop [historical familiarity and policymaking
expertise].” ); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 505 (1988) (examining a conflict
between the secretary of the interior and the secretary of the army).
189. See, e.g., Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 211–16
(criticizing the exclusive-jurisdiction presumption); see also Andrew B. Whitford, Adapting
Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design of Bureaucratic Performance, in
POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
BUREAUCRACY 160, 162–64 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003) (“Agencies will
respond to comparison, competition, and information revelation because of the real world
implications of failure.”). A related, but not identical, variation on the overlap question inquires
into when private actors should be able to enforce statutory commands in addition to
administrative agencies. See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the
Private and the Social Motive To Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997)
(examining the benefits and drawbacks of private enforcement).
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jurisdiction at issue here. These advances in administrative law, in
turn, have drawn on theories developed in the organizational-design
literature about how to identify the optimal quantum of redundancy
in complex administrative systems, such as public-transportation
191
networks and cislunar exploration. Neither the federal courts nor
the administrative-law scholarship speaks directly to the problems of
designing a terrorist-detention system. Both though attest to the
significance of jurisdictional redundancy in complex regulatory
situations. Both also provide hints of how overlap might influence
192
policy outcomes in the national-security domain.
A. Accuracy Effects of Redundancy
Redundancy in jurisdictional specification creates options for the
government along two dimensions. First, when the government
initially detains a person, it might have a choice among different
forums. Second, if a chosen forum does not yield the outcome that the
government sought, the government may be able to employ a second
forum. In both cases, the availability of options has an effect on the
government’s strategy. This effect in turn influences the frequency
and type of errors. To understand the connection between
jurisdictional choice and accuracy, it is therefore necessary to clarify

190. See Cover, supra note 27, at 654–57 (noting that jurisdictional redundancy does not
raise the same questions as policymaking redundancy).
191. Beginning in the 1960s, organizational theorists demonstrated that reserve capacity has
significant positive effects on system outcomes. Early research focused on public-transit
systems. One early study of redundancy demonstrated that the “loosely coupled” and
“jurisdictional[ly] fragment[ed]” public-transit system of the San Francisco Bay area was
substantially better able to deal with unexpected shocks, such as major accidents and natural
disasters, than a more streamlined arrangement would have been. Martin Landau, On
Multiorganizational Systems in Public Administration, 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 7, 10
(1991). Subsequent studies focused on other complex government systems, such as the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s space-shuttle program, which is also designed to avoid
extremely costly failures. E.g., Larry Heimann, Understanding the Challenger Disaster:
Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 421 (1993);
see also Sagan, supra note 25, at 944–45 (questioning “the common, but false, intuition that
actions taken to improve security will always have a positive effect”).
192. The question of jurisdictional overlap also arises in the literature on federal courts’
choice of law in diversity cases under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in
which fairness and forum shopping are also central concerns. See generally RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 590 (6th ed. 2009)
(summarizing the arguments). Extended treatment of the analogy is inapt since the
disaggregated strategic choices of multiple plaintiffs would be modeled differently from the
actions of the unitary government actor at issue here.
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how redundancy channels government action and to examine how the
resulting changes in government strategy influence error rates.
1. The Government’s Use of Redundancy. I begin by examining
the immediate uses of redundancy from the government’s
perspective. Consider first how the government can employ
simultaneous overlap to limit some errors. Despite Professors
Chesney and Goldsmith’s claim about the convergence in substantive
193
and procedural rules used in different forums, gaps between the
procedural frameworks of criminal and noncriminal detention, the
first and second columns of Table 1, remain. In addition, some
differences remain between Article III criminal trials and military
194
commissions. As a result, the choice of forums presents the
government with some opportunity for positive jurisdictional
arbitrage—the selection of the forum with the lowest costs in terms of
195
the evidence and effort needed to secure detention. Jurisdictional
arbitrage allows the government to match suspects to forums based
on the kind of inculpatory evidence available or the nature of the
charges against the person. When inculpatory evidence has been
collected on the battlefield or from a foreign sovereign that wishes to
196
remain anonymous, such arbitrage allows the government to secure
detention through low-process channels on a case-by-case basis.
Using these tactics, the government can preserve the availability of
rigorous forms of adjudication, such as Article III criminal trials,
without having to bear the costs of release as a result of exogenous

193. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 1800–01.
194. For example, a federal court must determine that a criminal defendant’s confession was
voluntary before admitting it. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006). By contrast, the military commissions are
instructed not to admit confessions elicited by torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a) (Supp. IV 2010). But a military judge can admit a statement if it
is reliable and sufficiently probative if it was made “incident to lawful conduct during military
operations at the point of capture or during closely related combat engagement, and the
interests of justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.” Id.
§ 948r(c).
195. For a similar use of the same term in the context of arbitrage at the international level
between different jurisdictions, see Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The
Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 269 (2010).
196. See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operation in
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law,
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 212 (2011) (“States may capture nonstate fighters on or adjacent to the
battlefield in circumstances where evidence collection either cannot occur or cannot be a
priority. Sources of evidence may also include intelligence sources that cannot be subjected to
the rigors of confrontation without compromising sources and methods.”).
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circumstances beyond its control in cases in which those rigorous
forms would yield unsatisfactory outcomes.
Such redundancy may be especially important in times of
emergency. Redundancy allows the government to parcel out tasks in
new ways if one jurisdictional channel is overloaded or otherwise
unavailable. Emergencies are also moments when catastrophic harms
may be more likely. As a result, the burden imposed by reserve
capacity in ordinary times may be offset by its heightened utility
during emergencies. Excess capacity—such as that created in the area
of the government’s immigration powers—provided one way for the
government to mitigate the possibility of bad outcomes even though it
also required bearing the long-term costs of maintaining an oversized
197
standing corps of immigration officials and adjudicators. This effect
of redundancy is a positive one.
Sequential overlap has a different use: it mitigates the risk that
198
the forum initially chosen will yield a false acquittal. It thereby
serves as insurance. In the case of Lyglenson Lemorin, for example,
the government turned to the immigration system after failing to
199
secure its desired outcome through the criminal-justice system. The
availability of immigration detention mitigated the cost to the
government of a failure to convict on criminal charges. The trajectory
of the Padilla and al-Marri cases illustrates use of sequential
redundancy to mitigate a different risk of forum failure. In both cases,
the government had transferred the suspects out of military detention
200
at the cusp of Supreme Court review of their cases. The government
thereby avoided the risk of an adverse legal judgment that might have
restrained its options in future cases. Redundancy in these cases
provided insurance not against terrorist events but against adverse
legal outcomes. Like the option created by simultaneous overlap, this
insurance effect may be especially important in the aftermath of an

197. Professor Cover argues that the same is more generally true with respect to the
creation of special commissions and other bodies designed to check the results of a criminal
process. Cover, supra note 27, at 656 (“Ad hoc ‘jurisdictional’ redundancy is commonly
demanded when questions of factual error assume massive political significance.”).
198. See Landau, supra note 129, at 349 (discussing how redundancy can result in increased
liability within complicated systems). The sequential redundancy created by habeas jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) serves the same function of error correction.
199. See supra text accompanying note 131.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 144–45.
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201

exogenous shock. The more risk-averse a system’s designers are, the
higher the option’s value will be.
Commentators have noted this function of sequential
redundancy but have not asked how its existence affects the detention
202
system as a whole. Three complicating downstream effects are
worth emphasizing. First, the use of sequential or simultaneous
redundancy may mitigate pressure to ease procedural rules or expand
the substantive reach of the first-choice forum. For example, if
officials knew that they had the possibility of immigration detention
or enemy-combatant detention as a backup, they would have less
incentive to press federal judges or Congress for changes to Article
III criminal process. In this way, the mere possibility of sequential
overlap—even without its frequent use—provides some breathing
room for the robust protections of rights in the Article III criminal
context.
Second, sequential redundancy creates a moral-hazard problem
203
for prosecutors and investigators. By reducing the costs of failure in
the first-choice forum, it blunts the incentive for officials to prosecute
a case vigorously in that context. Underinvestment in the first-choice
forum increases the need for subsequent recourse to the secondchoice forum. Because the government may not prevail in every case
in the second-choice forum, a less-than-vigorous prosecution in the
first-choice forum may incrementally raise the possibility of a policy
failure overall. It is not clear how large this moral-hazard problem is
on the ground. Reputational and normative constraints may
sufficiently bind officials and mitigate any slackening of effort
204
induced by sequential overlap.
Third, simultaneous redundancy opens up the possibility that the
selection of the threshold forum will be motivated initially not by

201. See, e.g., Landau, supra note 191, at 5, 10–11, 15–16 (emphasizing the importance of
reserve capacity in transit systems during emergencies); Staudt, supra note 28, at 1213 (making
the same point with regard to the provision of social-welfare goods).
202. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 16, at 695–96 (noting the potential “perverse effect” of
limiting counterterrorism to Article III criminal prosecutions).
203. “Moral hazard is the . . . tendency of an insured to underallocate to loss prevention
after purchasing insurance.” KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14 (1986).
204. By analogy, the obligation to provide disaster relief may not be needed to induce
optimal precautions against terrorism because such “precautions are already encouraged by
political self-interest and, no doubt, by a deeply held commitment to the safety of the country.”
Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—And Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV.
268, 311 (2003).
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public-policy concerns but by considerations of electoral politics.
That is, the moment of choice for the executive can become an
opportunity for political mobilization by critics of an administration
who argue that a president is either too soft on terror or an incipient
abuser of constitutional liberties. Rather than being the output of
reasoned deliberation, decisions under these conditions may flow
from raw partisan political calculation. And the problem may be
endemic. That is, any kind of forum optionality creates the
opportunity for not only rational deliberation but also distortive
politicization.
How important are these collateral effects of sequential
redundancy on the ground? The data presented in Parts I and II
suggest that these effects are real but less frequently encountered
than might be expected. Recall that the main channel for terrorist
detentions has been the Article III criminal process. Immigration
detention and enemy-combatant detention were relied upon most
heavily in the direct aftermath of 9/11. Since then, the government
206
has relied on them less and less. The heavy reliance on alternatives
to the Article III criminal process after 9/11 is consistent with
organizational theorists’ insight that reserve capacity is most valuable
in the wake of exogenous shocks and is less utilized as governance
207
systems find a new equilibrium that accounts for the shock. Some
evidence also suggests that the government has exploited sequential
overlap, both to prevent the release of a dangerous suspect and also
to forestall an adverse litigation outcome that, in its view, would have
208
had costly repercussions. But any moral-hazard effect from the
existence of redundancy appears to be tamped down by reputational
and normative constraints. Department of Justice lawyers, in other
words, still prosecute terrorism-related cases vigorously even though
the cost of their mistakes is buffered by other parts of the
209
jurisdictional system.
Similarly, at least through the Bush

205. Cf. Kuhn, supra note 9, at 224 (“Undoubtedly, for some in Congress, detention policy is
worth more as a political issue than as a potential policy accomplishment.”).
206. See supra Part I.
207. See Landau, supra note 191, at 12 (“Were we to remove all [redundancy] . . . we would
get a brittle structure incapable of coping with surprise . . . .”).
208. See supra Part II.B.
209. The availability of pretextual charges may also have a buffering effect within the
criminal-justice system. That is, prosecutors can supply their own insurance by charging suspects
with ancillary offenses.
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administration, initial forum selections did not appear to catalyze
political firestorms that distorted venue choices.
In short, redundancy provides a mechanism for the government
to mitigate the cost of shortfalls in evidence or adjudicative failures in
a first-choice forum. Used to this end, redundancy likely has
downstream effects on the rate of change to procedural rules and on
prosecutors’ incentives. Based on these mechanisms alone, the effect
of redundancy on accuracy might be positive, especially if prosecutors
are subject to exogenous pressures to adhere to professional norms.
But these mechanisms alone do not provide a complete picture.
Other connections between redundancy and accuracy cut in the other
direction.
2. The Complex Effects of Redundancy on Error Rates. The
government’s observed use of redundancy highlights one set of
mechanisms linking jurisdictional specification and error rates. But
more careful analysis suggests others. Simultaneous and sequential
forms of redundancy have distinct effects on error rates. Their net
effect can be understood only by disaggregating two different sorts of
errors at issue. To conclude simply that jurisdictional arbitrage and
do-overs reduce errors overall is to move too quickly.
It is standard in the many fields of systems analysis to refer to
two different kinds of errors that can arise in complex systems
designed to pick out individuals with hard-to-observe traits from a
larger population. First, in a Type I error, the government chooses to
act when it should not have done so, generating a false positive.
Second, in a Type II error, the government fails to act when it should
210
have done so, producing a false negative. Simultaneous and
sequential forms of overlap influence false positives and false
negatives differently. The two kinds of redundancy are therefore
worth distinguishing and considering separately.
With the use of simultaneous overlap, error rates are a simple
function of the government’s choice of forum. The existence of
overlap changes error rates only to the extent that the government
engages in jurisdictional arbitrage and that the procedures in the two
forums are different. At the opening of this Part, I sketch an
optimistic story of the government’s matching cases to venues based

210. Cf. Heimann, supra note 191, at 422 (“[I]f NASA decided not to launch a mission that
was technologically sound, then it would have committed a type II error.”). I will refer for
simplicity’s sake to false positives and false negatives for the remainder of the discussion.
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on exogenous constraints, an opportunity made possible by the
211
availability of positive jurisdictional arbitrage. But it is possible to
imagine a darker story of negative jurisdictional arbitrage. For
example, imagine the government matches cases to forums based not
only on the strength of available evidence but also upon purely
endogenous factors. This strategy may well have a perverse effect.
Suspects against whom the evidence favoring detention is weak will
be funneled to a low-process pathway. Suspects against whom the
evidence favoring detention is strong will remain in a high-process
forum. As a result, both groups of suspects will be detained at roughly
equal rates, even though suspects against whom the evidence is weak
should be detained less frequently. On the whole, the system will
predictably have a high level of false positives and a low level of false
negatives. In other words, procedural arbitrage made possible by
simultaneous overlap may be either desirable or pernicious. How it is
assessed may depend on the reasons for the government’s matching
decision. If the government is responding to exogenous constraints,
one might view it in a positive light, but if the government is making
choices endogenously based on its own exertion of effort, the results
may be undesirable.
A further analytic wrinkle meriting notice here is that the costs
of a false negative’s taking the form of a conviction may be greater
than the costs of a false negative’s taking the form of a simple
detention decision. This possibility exists because a formal conviction
may be more difficult or more politically costly to undo than an
ongoing detention. Perhaps offsetting this effect, there may be more
procedural avenues built into the system to challenge false
convictions than to challenge flawed detentions.
The effects of sequential overlap are even more complex. It is
worth looking first at its effect on a single case and then asking
separately whether it has dynamic effects over time. Start with the
simple case of a one-shot use of sequential overlap. When the
government has the option of using sequential overlap to mitigate the
risk of failure in a first forum, it will opt for a second round of
adjudication only when it fails to secure detention in the first round.
The asymmetrical stacking of processes by the government will have
divergent effects on the rate of false positives and the rate of false
negatives. On the one hand, false negatives will arise only when both

211. See supra Part III.A.1.
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the first and the second process fail to produce the desired result. The
rate of false negatives in a system with sequential overlap will
therefore be the mathematical product of the probabilities of failure
at each stage. For example, imagine a highly simplified situation in
which both forums erroneously acquit with a probability of 0.5. If the
government chooses to take two bites at the apple, the risk of a false
negative in a given case drops to 0.25—the product of 0.5 and 0.5. In
short, in the context of false negatives, sequential overlap will be
212
considerably less error-prone than a single-shot system.
On the other hand, the government’s use of sequential overlap
creates a system in which false positives may be obtained in both the
first and second rounds. Imagine, again hypothetically, that both
forums have a 0.5 probability of convicting an innocent person. If the
government always turns to the second forum when the first forum
has failed to produce a conviction, the chance of convicting an
innocent person would increase to 0.75—the 0.5 risk of wrongful
conviction in the first forum, added to 0.25, the product of 0.5 and the
0.5 risk of wrongful conviction in the second forum. Rather than
mitigating the likelihood of error, sequential overlap has the effect of
increasing the probability of a false positive in relation to the base
213
rate of error in either forum standing alone.
Sequential redundancy thus has different effects on false
positives and false negatives. It increases the former at the same time
that it decreases the latter. Assessing the desirability of jurisdictional
overlap therefore turns on an evaluation of the relative welfare costs
of false negatives and false positives. This comparison is beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that false negatives are not
self-evidently more costly than false positives. There is a tendency to
assume that a false negative will have a catastrophic cost—for
example, another attack similar in scale to 9/11. But not all terrorist
attacks are 9/11. Since 1970, only 118 incidents of terrorism worldwide
have killed more than one hundred people. This number represents
214
0.12 percent of the 98,000 terrorist events in that period. Although

212. For situations in which multiple venues have divergent error rates—for example, of 0.1,
0.25, and 0.5—adding unrestrained sequential overlap among the three venues would not
necessarily reduce error rates compared to those yielded by exclusive use of the most accurate
forum.
213. For a formal statement of this point, see Heimann, supra note 191, at 426.
214. See Advanced Search, GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
search (open “Casualties” tab; select Casualty Type: “Fatalities Only” and Number of
Casualties: “101+”; follow “Search” hyperlink).
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always morally deplorable, terrorism is not categorically catastrophic
in simple numeric terms. Furthermore, false negatives matter most
when a terrorist organization is unable to substitute for the detained
attacker. If a terrorist organization is able to substitute a new
operative for a captured one, the expected value of a capture for the
government falls.
The possibility of a do-over in a second forum influences
outcomes through a second, dynamic mechanism that manifests only
over time. Previous scholarship has established that in adjudicative
systems with asymmetrical appeal rules—such as those that allow one
side but not the other to appeal—the structure of appellate review
will change the substantive legal standard in a predictable direction.
For example, in the patent context, an asymmetrical appeal rule
governing decisions by the Patent and Trademark Office has led to a
drift in the legal standard. This phenomenon has been termed “patent
215
inflation” by one scholar. An analogous mechanism might result
from the operation of sequential overlap in the context of terrorismrelated detention because only the government can choose to invoke
the second forum’s jurisdiction.
Here is how an analogous mechanism might work, mutatis
216
mutandi, in the terrorism context: In a system in which one forum
operates as a backup for a primary forum, the government decides
which cases go to the second forum. The government will present
there only cases that it has lost in the first forum. Its selection of cases
in consequence will include a disproportionate number in which the
evidence against the suspect is weak. The median case filed in the
second forum will be weaker than the median case drawn from the
pool of all potential cases. Consider how this dynamic affects the legal
standard used in the second-choice forum. In each of the possible
second-choice forums, panels of judges use a system of internal
precedent that sets a factual benchmark for what justifies detention.
Each of the possible second-choice forums also has a pool of
adjudicators that is heterogeneous. In this pool, there will be prodetainee and pro-detention panels of judges. Assuming that panels
215. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 470 (2011).
216. The following builds on Professor Masur’s pathmarking analysis, although it is worth
noting that he identifies effects in the first-round forum that are absent here. See id. at 510–12
(showing how a permissive ruling in the second-round forum, the Federal Circuit, allows the
first-round forum, the Patent and Trademark Office, to further push the boundaries of
permissive patent rulings). Further, my analysis focuses on two separate forums, not two venues
linked by a hierarchical appeals structure.

HUQ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1468

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/20/2012 12:33 AM

[Vol. 61:1415

are drawn at random, the joint effect of (a) an asymmetrically
distributed stream of cases—with more hard cases for the government
than easy cases—and (b) heterogeneous judges will be to move the
detention benchmark in a pro-detention direction over time. Prodetention panels will be more likely than pro-detainee panels to
shape precedent because more hard cases for the government than
easy ones will come before the court, and therefore panels will hear
more close cases in which the legal rule could be shifted in the
government’s direction. Over time, this process will repeat as the
government continues to exploit sequential redundancy, and the law
will gradually shift in the government’s favor. This shift will
exacerbate the other effects I have noted. It will, that is, further
increase the number of false positives and further decrease the
number of false negatives. Assuming an exogenously defined
standard of detention, this change in the law will yield a higher
probability of false positives than false negatives over time. How
strong this inflationary effect may be will depend, among other things,
on the measure of sequential redundancy and the variance in the
government’s first-round choice of forum.
The relationship between jurisdictional redundancy and
accuracy, in short, is more complex than generally believed.
Simultaneous and sequential forms of overlap have different effects.
Their influence on false positives and false negatives must be
considered separately. In addition to its effects in discrete cases,
sequential overlap has a subtler effect over time via potential changes
to the relevant legal standard. How these effects are evaluated, of
course, depends on how false positives and false negatives are
assessed and on which are seen as more costly.
B. The Costs of Redundancy
An intuitive objection to redundancy is on the basis of cost.
Maintaining two systems is often assumed to be more expensive than
maintaining one, if only because one system necessarily will lie fallow
occasionally. In the jurisdictional context, this observation requires a
caveat and some extensions. The government’s decision to maintain
spare capacity is not always meaningfully more expensive. But
creating new reserve capacity can impose costs not only upon
government but also upon third parties. A full accounting of the
social cost of jurisdictional redundancy therefore must address both
the potential costs internalized by the government and the potential
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externalities—costs imposed upon third parties—especially those that
government is unlikely to account for in its policy determinations.
1. Costs to Government. Jurisdictional redundancy is created
either by expanding the authority of existing forums or by creating
217
new ones. An example of the first is the immigration system’s
218
deployment after 9/11 to pick up some terrorist-detention functions.
An example of the second is the military-commission system. These
two methods of creating overlap have distinct cost profiles.
Expanding existing jurisdictions is relatively inexpensive because
the fixed costs of running the forum have already been expended. The
change in variable costs from the new responsibilities is not zero—
regulations must be promulgated and agency staff reassigned, for
example—but it is likely to be low. Every time the government begins
a new action in a forum, it incurs some costs. But again, the marginal
cost of each new action is likely to be relatively low. Supplementing
existing institutions with new responsibilities is therefore a reasonably
cost-effective strategy from the government’s perspective.
Creating redundancy from scratch is a different matter.
Institutional innovation is typically motivated by a belief that new
219
entities will yield dramatically better or cheaper policy outcomes.
But designing and implementing a new institution is costly. Lawyers
and policymakers must be reassigned from their ordinary tasks and
given new and unfamiliar responsibilities. Other policies and projects
lose resources. Jurisdictional innovation may trigger political
resistance by existing stakeholders based on fears that it will be used
to circumvent binding constitutional precommitments. Adjudication
is sufficiently complex that designers of new institutions must either
expend considerable time and effort or live with legal uncertainty
regarding process and outcomes. These costs create a double bind for
institutional designers. The more effort those designers expend on
specifying rules and resolving uncertainties, the more time and
resources a startup demands. The less effort they expend on clarifying

217. This distinction is similar to the one drawn by Professor Lerner between “duplication,”
which involves parallelism of functions, and “overlap,” which assumes different units assigned a
range of functions. Lerner, supra note 127, at 336–37, 342.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 78–84.
219. See, e.g., Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice:
Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
87, 100–04 (2008) (proposing that only a national-security court can provide the optimal mix of
legitimacy, procedural rigor, and specialization).
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institutional parameters, the greater the frictional costs of gaining
institutional momentum. Borrowing rules from existing institutions is
no panacea: the greater the borrowing, the less innovative the new
institution will be and the less will be gained in improved policy
outputs. The upside of institutional startups is therefore constrained
by the attendant costs.
Experience with military commissions suggests that startup costs
in the context of national security can be substantial. The relatively
slow startup of procedures in military commissions is best explained
220
in terms of the tradeoff inherent in institutional startups. To be sure,
military commissions had been used periodically since the
221
Revolutionary period. But the military commissions envisaged by
President Bush’s November 2001 executive order were in many ways
222
a novelty. As such, they created additional uncertainty about
procedural and substantive rules that were already subject to
contestation under international and domestic law. Among the
confusion-inducing procedural issues raised in early proceedings were
fights about the joinder of different trials, the possibility of selfrepresentation and related questions of defendants’ competency, and
223
the standard for judicial recusal. Initial rulings on procedural
ambiguities seemed to be “ma[de] . . . up” as the proceedings
224
unfolded; prosecutors protested and sought transfer on ethical
grounds, with some accusing the commissions of lacking fundamental
225
fairness; and commission judges evinced what one military lawyer
226
labeled “an embarrassing lack of knowledge about the law of war.”

220. Delay cannot be explained by detainees’ challenges; detainees were only assigned
counsel in 2003 and charged before the commission in June 2004—almost three years after the
November 2001 order. Glazier, supra note 95, at 157–58.
221. Cf. Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military
Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 720–25 (2002)
(describing Revolutionary War usage of military commissions).
222. To be sure, no innovation was needed to expose al Qaeda members to military criminal
process even in 2001. Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000) (vesting courts-martial with general jurisdiction
over any person amenable to trial under the laws of war).
223. Glazier, supra note 95, at 163–66.
224. Deborah Pearlstein, Four Issues of Concern, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Aug. 23, 2004),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2004/08/23/four-issues-of-concern.
225. See, e.g., Legal Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16–18 (2009) (statement of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. Vandeveld)
(recounting his experience as “a prosecutor in the Office of Military Commissions in
Guantanamo Bay from May 2007 through December 2008” who underwent a “profound change
of heart and mind when [he] realized through firsthand observation and through [his] own
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Congressional intervention did not mitigate these procedural
problems. In June 2007, the newly reconstituted commissions, acting
on the basis of the 2006 statutory authorization, dismissed all charges
against the two remaining defendants. The commissions explained
that the defendants had been found by earlier military hearings to be
“enemy combatants” but not “alien unlawful enemy combatants,”
which was the category used in the 2006 statute’s threshold
227
jurisdictional provision.
That is, describing the commission’s
jurisdiction, Congress had employed a jurisdictional neologism that
was inconsistent with the definitions of enemy combatant that had
previously been employed by the military. It took a costly and timeconsuming appeal to the Court of Military Commission Review to
resolve the confusion. That court found that the jurisdictional defect
could be remedied through supplemental factfinding by the military
228
commission itself. The delay, uncertainty, and sheer cost of these
proceedings could have been avoided had the government chosen to
invoke longstanding court-martial jurisdiction over war crimes rather
than to create military commissions from scratch. Alternatively, the
government could have expended significant additional resources at
the outset to generate comprehensive rules and regulations. Unlike
military commissions, courts-martial could have drawn on decades of
clarifying precedent about process and substance in a way that
military commissions could not. But that path was not taken. Instead,
military tribunals struggled for almost a decade with few convictions,
229
none of which involved noteworthy defendants. The accumulated

actions that what [he] was seeing at Guantanamo was not at all consistent with our core values
of justice and due process of law”).
226. Glazier, supra note 95, at 162.
227. See United States v. Hamdan, No. 04-0004, slip. op. at 2 (Mil. Comm’n June 4, 2007)
(“The 2004 CSRT determination that the accused is an ‘enemy combatant’ was made for the
purposes of determining whether or not he was properly detained, and not for the purpose of
determining whether he was subject to trial by military commission.” (quoting Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 3, § 948d(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2603)).
228. United States v. Khadr, No. CMCR 07-001, slip op. at 19–25 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev.
Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/archives/CMCR%20ruling%209-2407.pdf.
229. For an exemplary account of military commissions published in these pages, see David
J.R. Frakt, Mohammed Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L.J.
1367 (2011). More generally, none of the defendants before military commissions so far, perhaps
with the exception of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al-Bahlul, have been alleged to have had
substantial authority within al Qaeda. See The Guantanamo Trials, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/features/guantanamo (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (listing defendants who
have appeared before the military commission and providing case summaries).
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force of path-dependent learning, in other words, may cut against
institutional innovations.
The costs of creating redundancy from scratch are greatest in the
early days of a new institution. In the terrorism context, this reality
means that the costs are greatest when the policy need is most
acute—in the immediate wake of a crisis. As Part I demonstrates, it
was in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that a need for
new jurisdictional capacity was felt. Yet that moment was precisely
when the commissions were hamstrung and contributed little but
legal uncertainty and fodder for law reviews.
The perceived difficulties of terrorism adjudication have
prompted some commentators to propose creation of a new “national
security court” that blends traits of the Article III criminal-justice
230
process with aspects of military adjudication. This new institution is
lauded as a “third way” to “get us out of the quicksand we find
231
ourselves in regarding detainees.” Proponents assert that the
innovation would “strike the balance between national security,
232
human rights, and due process.” Unlike military commissions,
however, a national-security court would lack even a de minimis
233
historical pedigree. Its designers would need to grapple with the full
panoply of procedural and substantive questions that Article III
courts have largely addressed and that military commissions are
beginning to resolve. Past experience suggests that the resulting
234
startup costs would be very high. A “fresh start” thus has a large
price tag that advocates of national-security courts have failed to
address. Worse, beyond platitudes about a “third way,” advocates of
institutional innovation do not adequately explain how their new

230. See, e.g., GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL
EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2009) (arguing for the creation of a court that
balances national-security concerns and due-process rights); Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 219
(proposing the creation of an Article III court to address the difficulties in terrorist detention).
For an analysis of other nations’ experiences with specialized security-related courts, see Laura
K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial by Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and American
Criminal Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1324–29 (2007); and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and
Balances in Wartime: American, British, and Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (2004).
231. SULMASY, supra note 230, at 157, 193.
232. Id. at 175.
233. For an argument that even the November 2001 commissions possessed such legitimacy,
see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack A. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military
Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002).
234. Glenn M. Sulmasy & Andrea K. Logman, A Hybrid Court for a Hybrid War, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 299, 319 (2009).
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forum would be a marked improvement on the existing combination
of overlapping forums. Given the high costs of institutional startup,
the burden should be on the advocates to show why their proposal is
235
plausible, let alone justified.
2. Third-Party Effects. Adding jurisdictional redundancy to the
status quo also imposes costs on third parties beyond the sheer dollar
price to the government. First, it imposes costs on all those exposed to
the system. Second, it may have wider, more systemic effects on the
general population. Such costs are often discounted or ignored in the
public debate because they are diffuse and are often imposed on
politically marginalized constituencies, but there is no ex ante reason
to dismiss them as trivial.
The most powerful objection to jurisdictional arbitrage and
sequential overlap is that they enable circumvention of individual
constitutional rights, a result that saps public confidence in
constitutional constraints and thus imposes demoralization costs. By
switching from the Article III criminal process to a less demanding
forum, the government is able to secure detention without complying
236
with otherwise-mandatory constitutional safeguards. Circumvention
arguments assume a domain of cases in which a defendant is entitled
to an Article III criminal process before suffering certain kinds of
liberty deprivation. The Supreme Court, despite having hinted that
such a limit might exist, has never defined the zone of exclusive
237
Article III criminal jurisdiction. The circumvention argument has its
greatest force in contexts in which the application of constitutional
protections is uncontested, such as the detention of U.S. citizens
within the United States. It has its least force when a person is seized
in a context in which the application of domestic criminal law is more
235. The central claim of such proposals is that a new tribunal would strike a better
“balance” between liberty and security interests. SULMASY, supra note 230, at 175. But the
optimal balance of those values is deeply contested, and advocates of national-security courts
fail to supply an account of the optimal balance.
236. Criminal-law scholars have expressed a concern that prosecutors will evade criminalprocedure rules by turning to the civil law or broadening the substantive scope of the criminal
law. E.g.,William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1, 17–18 (1996). The evidence compiled in Part I suggests both dynamics are
discernible in the terrorist-detention domain.
237. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting that noncriminal detention is
permissible only “in certain special and ‘narrow’ nonpunitive ‘circumstances’” (quoting Foucha
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))); see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83 (invalidating a Louisiana
statute that authorized civil commitment on a finding of dangerousness without requiring a
finding of mental illness).
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contested. Battlefield seizures of noncitizens overseas arguably
exemplify this second type.
Circumvention objections have been raised unsuccessfully
238
239
against military detention and immigration detention. In the
context of immigration, the Court rejected the circumvention
240
argument early in the twentieth century. That holding seems
unlikely to be revisited. In the context of military detention, the law
241
with respect to seizures in the United States is unsettled. Military
detention of suspects seized outside the United States raises no
constitutional red flag. Lower courts also have allowed executive
detention within the United States, although those rulings have been
242
hotly contested.
Although they are perhaps unlikely to prevail in federal court,
circumvention arguments identify a cost attached to jurisdictional
redundancy. The visible use of overlapping jurisdiction undermines
confidence in the value of constitutional rights. It may induce in the
general public a belief that constitutional entitlements are fragile and
243
easily gamed by the very government they are designed to restrain.
In other contexts, manifest disregard of constitutional rights has been
thought to have demoralizing effects, as people cease to enjoy the
possession of constitutional rights when they cease to believe those
244
rights are valuable.
In addition, past acts of circumvention have undermined the
government’s credibility with the judiciary. To the extent that such
credibility is a valuable political asset to the government,
circumvention may narrow the government’s options in subsequent
238. See, e.g., Daniel Moeckli, The US Supreme Court’s ‘Enemy Combatant’ Decisions: A
‘Major Victory for the Rule of Law’?, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 75, 79 (2005) (arguing that
“the designation as ‘enemy combatants’ seems to have been mainly designed to circumvent the
procedural safeguards applicable in normal criminal procedures”).
239. See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1581 (2008) (expressing concern about circumvention risk
through state enforcement of federal immigration law).
240. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
241. For example, see the fractured opinions in Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th
Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
242. E.g., id.
243. To be sure, it is also possible that the public will feel more secure because they believe
that the only persons susceptible to the new forms of adjudication are minorities or noncitizens.
244. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1210–11 (1967) (introducing
the idea of demoralization costs with respect to owners when property is condemned and with
respect to others who believe as a consequence that their property is less secure).
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245

cases when a policy failure would be more costly. Consider the
example of José Padilla, first detained as a material witness, then as
an enemy combatant, and finally switched back to the Article III
criminal process. When the Department of Justice sought to end
Padilla’s challenge to his military detention and obviate Supreme
Court review, it filed a motion for vacatur of the Fourth Circuit’s
ruling on Padilla’s habeas petition. The circuit court declined.
Explaining the refusal, Judge Michael Luttig expressed concern that
“intentional mooting by the government of a case of this import out
of concern for Supreme Court consideration” was not a “legitimate
246
justification but [an] admission of attempted avoidance of review.”
He further warned of damage to “the government’s credibility before
the courts” from the perception that jurisdictional arbitrage was
247
based on mere “expediency.”
That is, the exploitation of
jurisdictional redundancy can influence judicial as well as popular
perceptions of the legitimacy of policies in ways that limit the
government’s future jurisdictional options.
A second externality, also denominated in terms of public
demoralization, is worth mentioning. Scholars of criminal law have
observed that the growing duration and uncertainty of the criminal
process have made the “[p]rocess . . . the [p]unishment” for those
248
exposed to the possibility of criminal penalties. For most people, the
uncertainty of possible criminal punishment and the anxiety
engendered by waiting are substantial. In the national-security
context, those costs are aggravated in two ways: First, pretrial
detainees in terrorism cases often are held under highly restrictive
conditions pursuant to “special administrative measures” that
249
significantly limit human contact and mobility. Second—and more
importantly here—sequential overlap dramatically increases the

245. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 865 (2007) (developing the importance of credibility for an executive otherwise
unconstrained by law).
246. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2005).
247. Id. at 587.
248. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CIRCUIT COURT 199–243 (1979) (developing this argument with respect to
the ordinary criminal process).
249. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2011) (authorizing the attorney general to require “special
administrative measures” that limit human contact when it is “reasonably necessary to protect
persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury”); see also United States v. Hashmi, 621
F. Supp. 2d 76, 79–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing the use of special administrative measures in a
terrorism case).
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potential duration and uncertainty of the criminal process for anyone
exposed to the first-choice process. Defendants in criminal terrorism
proceedings, for example, must account for the possibility that even if
they prevail in an Article III criminal process, they still may be
detained and subjected to another process in which they have fewer
procedural protections. Across the board, this uncertainty imposes a
toll on defendants quite apart from the cost of false positives. The
shadow of sequential overlap, moreover, may induce some
defendants to enter plea agreements accepting responsibility for
offenses that a rational calculation of their exposure under the
250
criminal law would not have induced.
Two objections to consideration of these costs are worth noting.
First, some of the enumerated externalities arise even in the absence
of formal redundancy if only a low-process venue is used. Hence, one
might say that they are effects of opting for low process rather than
effects of redundancy. But the analysis of institutional arrangements
is not done in a vacuum. Rather, it requires an accounting of changes
from the status quo. It is plausible to take the near-exclusive Article
III criminal jurisdiction in 2001 as a baseline to evaluate changes in
jurisdictional design. To the extent that these externalities follow
from new and emerging forms of redundancy, it would be misleading
to ignore them because to do so would undercount the costs of novel
forms of redundancy.
Second, these externalities do not necessarily arise simply
because redundancy exists. If redundancy exists but is used
infrequently, as was arguably the case a decade after the September
2001 attacks, these externalities may be minimal. People are rarely
demoralized by powers that remain latent. Process cannot be the
punishment if it is typically in desuetude. Only as redundancy is
increasingly used will these powers begin to be felt. Stated otherwise,
the cost curve for these externalities is concave, with small marginal
increases initially and large marginal increases as the amount of
251
systemic redundancy increases. This cost curve contrasts with the
distribution of the accuracy-related costs of increasing redundancy in
250. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, 1996 Statute Becomes the Justice Department’s Antiterror
Weapon of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15 (“Mr. Brown said his client had decided to
plead guilty after prosecutors suggested that Mr. Mosed [one of the Lackawanna suspects] could
be declared an enemy combatant and be held indefinitely without a lawyer, or be charged with
treason and face execution.”).
251. Similarly, the accuracy and start-up costs identified in Parts III.A and III.B are likely to
have concave cost curves.
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relation to insurance and moral-hazard effects. These costs increase
convexly as the use of redundancy is increased, with the greatest costs
accruing with the first uses of redundancy. This difference in cost
curves plays a role in Part IV’s assessment of proposals to eliminate
redundancy.
3. The Interaction of Accuracy and Cost Effects. Accuracy and
cost effects may interact such that sequential redundancy is most
likely to be invoked when accuracy costs are at their nadir and socialwelfare gains at their peak. To see this relationship, assume that the
government incurs some minimal cost associated with adjudication.
Trials of whatever kind are costly in terms of the manpower needed
to gather evidence and to present it in the correct form. These costs
plausibly influence when and how often the government considers
invoking sequential redundancy. Provided the marginal cost of a
second adjudication is not zero, the government also has some
incentive to turn to a second forum when the expected value of
detention is high rather than low. That is, there is at least some reason
to think that the marginal costs of invoking redundancy will
encourage its efficient use. For example, the government may use
sequential redundancy when it has inculpatory information that it
cannot disclose to first-round adjudicators. In this way, the interaction
between accuracy and cost effects would conduce to a desirable
allocation of adjudicative resources because government would
employ the second forum if and only if it were valuable to do so. The
force of this logic, though, depends on what the government values. If
the government values the elimination of terrorism risk, the logic
holds. If, however, the government values detention for some other
reason—say, because it seeks to avoid embarrassment or to maintain
its credibility as “tough on terror”—the salutary dynamic does not
hold.
4. Summary. Accuracy and cost are typically understood to be
important variables in the analysis of a terrorist-detention system.
This Section has demonstrated that redundancy has complex direct
effects on cost and accuracy. Redundancy does not always mitigate
the risk of policy failure and increase the risk of abusive government
behavior. And redundancy is not always associated with new
expenses. Rather, it is necessary to clarify the precise kind of
redundancy at issue and then to be clear about the relative costs of
false positives and false negatives.
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But this analysis of the direct effects of redundancy is
incomplete. Indirect mechanisms that link jurisdictional specifications
to policy outcomes of cost and accuracy also exist. The magnitude of
these indirect effects, to be sure, is likely to be smaller than that of the
direct effects, although perhaps not inframarginal. Indirect effects on
institutional incentives and cultures may also compound over time,
eventually working major changes to the distribution of policy
outcomes. The balance of this Part turns to those indirect mechanisms
and considers how redundancy influences agency relationships and
information flows.
C. Principal-Agent Costs
An agency problem arises when a principal delegates a task to an
agent but cannot fully monitor the amount of effort the agent uses to
252
complete the task. Political scientists have pointed out that agency
253
costs are a pervasive problem in government. To address the slack
that results from using agents, a principal must employ some costly
mix of incentives and monitoring. As a result, agency relationships
create costs that limit the achievement of policy goals, and, thus,
institutional designs that control agency costs improve outcomes.
The terrorist-detention context does not escape the problem of
agency costs. Adjudicators in federal courts and other forums are the
agents of legislators and presidents who set the terms of substantive
policy in the security domain insofar as they are tasked with the
254
execution of a statutory command. So too are the intelligence
agencies. Adjudicators and agencies, however, are only imperfectly
responsive to their elected principals. In part, this insulation from
political influences is due to Article III’s life-tenure rules and the
regulatory protections for Article I judges. And in part, it exists
because elected principals have limited information about their
agents’ performance, whereas agents have their own policy
255
preferences. Elected officials would prefer for adjudicators and

252. For a good introduction to agency problems, see generally Eric A. Posner, Agency
Models in Legal Scholarship, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric A.
Posner ed., 2000).
253. See, e.g., Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 203, 207, 209–10 (2005) (noting agency cost problems specifically in the context
of presidential power and congressional oversight).
254. Judicial review of constitutional matters is, of course, another story.
255. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 40 (1993) (“[T]he conditions of judicial
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intelligence agents to apply specific substantive criteria to evaluate
risks when they make detention decisions and to conform to certain
constitutional values. But elected officials cannot directly ascertain
whether adjudicators’ or agents’ behaviors align with these
preferences. The adjudicator and the agent have better information
than the elected principal about whether a particular risk threshold
has been crossed or whether a constitutional right was triggered in a
given case. All else being equal, greater agency slack entails less
accuracy and higher costs.
Jurisdictional redundancy could influence agency costs in two
ways: First, it might create competition among forums, competition
that in turn might foster incentives for adjudicators to conform to the
wishes of democratic principals. Second, redundancy could enable a
form of “costly signaling” that would provide Congress with
information about the performance of the intelligence agencies. The
effects of redundancy on agency costs are an indirect channel through
which institutional design influences policy outcomes.
1. Competition Among Forums.
From an adjudicator’s
perspective, the most important and immediately observable effect of
jurisdictional redundancy may be that it destroys any monopoly that
an adjudicator might claim on the novel and important subject matter
of terrorism. Redundancy instead induces competition among forums.
Congress, adjudicators, and government litigators may respond to this
competition in ways that influence policy outcomes.
Consider the matter first from the perspective of Congress. On
the one hand, jurisdictional redundancy may make oversight more
costly. The multiplicity of operational entities devoted to adjudication
makes it more difficult to ascertain why policy goals are not being
256
achieved. For example, overall underenforcement might be due to
the rigidity of constitutional rights in the Article III context, or it
might be a result of errors by immigration judges. Identifying the least

employment enable and induce judges to vote their personal convictions and policy
preferences—or in a word their values.”).
256. See Gersen, Unbundled Powers, supra note 28, at 327 (noting that “eliminating
overlapping responsibility for a given task . . . links institutional effort to policy success, which
provides greater institutional clarity and, as a result, a stronger foundation for electoral
control”).
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costly and most effective reform is also more difficult when there are
257
many, rather than few, potential culprits.
But on the other hand, jurisdictional competition might also
258
reduce the costs of monitoring. A multiplicity of adjudicative tools
addressing the same task can, under some circumstances, make
monitoring less costly by allowing “yardstick competition” among
259
entities engaged in similar tasks. To see this, imagine a principal
supervising the work of one administrative-law judge who handles
benefits claims. If the principal does not have information about the
underlying rate of valid claims or the time needed to process valid
and invalid claims, she may have difficulty knowing when to sanction
or praise the judge. By contrast, if the adjudicator has a dozen judges,
a supervisor could create a data set that enabled more informed
oversight through intragroup comparisons. To be sure, yardstick
comparisons may be more difficult when the different forums used for
determining terrorism status employ distinct procedures and
substantive definitions. And the possibility of deliberate procedural
arbitraging of cases between forums also may undermine simple
interjurisdictional comparisons. Nevertheless, in contrasting Article
III criminal courts and military commissions, a rational legislator
might set aside these differences as noise and review those forums’
respective performances when addressing specific legal issues, such as
the secrecy problems implicated by classified evidence or the
handling of evidence from other detainees in military custody. Direct
comparisons of how different forums address similar problems may
yield evidence that informs decisions about which forums to prefer
moving forward. In this way, yardstick comparisons are both possible
and potentially conducive to clear judgment.
Now consider the matter from the perspective of the adjudicator.
Here, the effect is more straightforward: redundancy creates an
incentive for the adjudicator to conform to the preferences of the
principal. Some adjudicators view terrorism as a high-priority,
260
prestigious bailiwick. Capturing that jurisdiction promotes the flow
257. This is known as a “team production” problem. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–83
(1972).
258. William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 636–37 (1975).
259. Cf. Maskin et al., supra note 25, at 360 (“[Y]ardstick competition between two regions
will be more effective in providing incentives than that between two ministries.”).
260. This is not true of all federal judges. See, e.g., Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1077–
78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring) (expressing doubts as to whether federal judges
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of resources and prestige both to their institutions and to themselves
individually. But adjudicators may also be poorly equipped to handle
this jurisdiction. For example, they may lack background knowledge
about terrorism or about the geopolitical conditions that are relevant
261
to threat assessments for specific suspects. Or they may be ill
262
informed about relevant bodies of law. Under either of these
conditions, agency costs arise because the adjudicator cannot pursue
the goals of the democratic principal without some number of errors.
The incentives created by competition among forums can,
however, be used to eliminate such deficiencies and thereby to reduce
agency costs. Scholars of administrative law have observed that “the
assignment of jurisdiction can be used to create incentives for
263
[decisionmakers] to invest in the development of expertise.” For
example, judges who wish to keep jurisdiction over terrorism-related
cases may be prompted to invest in gaining expertise about the laws
of war or the geopolitics of the Afghan-Pakistan theater to deflect
criticism that they are ill suited to determine the status of terrorism
suspects. Such specialization is not without precedent. In the habeas
context, some supporters of federal habeas review of state criminal
convictions note that it was particularly beneficial because of federal
judges’ ability to specialize in a smaller class of constitutional
questions. Advocates of a robust § 2254 habeas functionality contend
that habeas “isolat[es]” federal rights “from other elements in the
264
criminal process,” and thus make their vindication more likely.
Related to expertise is innovation. Most of the potential forums
for terrorism adjudication, such as Article III courts and the
immigration bench, are generalist institutions. Their procedural
frameworks are not tailored to the terrorism context. Competition
can be used to induce adjudicators in these forums to develop
procedural tools specifically crafted to handle terrorism-related
adjudication. In the Article III context, some judges have recognized
the possibility of competition from other forums and, in the same

should evaluate terrorism risk in individual cases). If more judges had Judge Silberman’s
attitude, redundancy might have the pernicious effect of enabling shirking.
261. This may be particularly true of immigration judges. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales,
430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing twelve examples in which the Seventh Circuit criticized
the decisions of immigration judges).
262. See, e.g., Glazier, supra note 95, at 162 (describing military-commission judges’ lack of
knowledge about the law of war).
263. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 213.
264. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 185, at 1045.
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breath, have expressed a willingness to tailor rules to the security
context. In a complex and controversial 2008 terrorism prosecution,
for example, a panel of the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the wide
disagreement over “the precise extent to which the formal criminaljustice process must be utilized when those suspected of participation
in terrorist cells and networks are involved” but emphasized in the
same passage that “the criminal-justice system does retain an
important place in the ongoing effort to deter and punish terrorist
acts . . . [and] is not without those attributes of adaptation that will
265
permit it to function in the post-9/11 world.” The circuit court
thereby recognized the pressure of interforum competition and
simultaneously signaled a willingness to innovate in response.
A study by the Federal Judiciary Center suggests that the Fourth
Circuit is not alone. The study enumerates dozens of procedural
innovations developed through common-law adjudication in response
266
to the distinctive aspects of terrorism cases. In the aforementioned
2008 case, for example, the Fourth Circuit rejected arguments that
statements made by the defendant to Saudi interrogators should be
suppressed because of the presence of U.S. officials in that
267
interrogation. The court thereby lowered the expected cost of
international collaboration among security agencies and made it
easier to triage terrorism cases into the Article III criminal context. In
the same decision, the Fourth Circuit also endorsed innovative
procedures to allow depositions of Saudi officials in Riyadh via
268
videoconference with the defendant in the United States. The court
concluded that videoconferencing vindicated the defendant’s
269
interests while preserving the secrecy
Confrontation Clause
270
interests of Saudi officials. Other courts have also found ways to

265. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 221 (4th Cir. 2008).
266. See ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL SECURITY CASE
STUDIES: SPECIAL CASE-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, at vii (2010), available at http://www.fjc
.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ts100222.pdf/$file/ts100222.pdf (indexing the procedural issues
addressed in the cases studied).
267. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 228–30 & n.5.
268. See id. at 239–43 (approving of depositions in which the defendant participated through
remote video link as consistent with the Confrontation Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VI); see
also United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (endorsing a
streamlined suppression hearing in which the defendant’s ability to question foreign intelligence
officials was curtailed).
269. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him . . . .”).
270. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 242.
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accommodate confrontation rights while also honoring the
271
confidentiality concerns of foreign intelligence agencies. Access to
exculpatory but classified evidence in the government’s possession
also has posed nettlesome constitutional problems under the Sixth
272
Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause. At least one federal
court has found a way to craft procedures that purport to enable
constitutionally sufficient access to such witnesses without
273
compromising secrecy.
Judges are not the only engine of interjurisdictional competition.
Prosecutors can also elicit innovation. For example, the criminal
division of the Department of Justice has approached Congress to
seek amendments to substantive criminal law or criminal procedures
274
that would enable more use of the Article III criminal process.
These officials are especially sensitive to the problem of underlap, a
situation in which a particular jurisdiction does not encompass a case
275
that officials believe should be regulated. As administrative-law
scholars have suggested, jurisdictional competition can “produce
276
desirable incentives” to identify and mitigate underlap. Hence,
Justice Department lawyers have an incentive—sharpened by
jurisdictional competition—to draw to Congress’s attention situations
in which they lack the ability to prosecute persons believed to pose
serious threats so as to maintain their institutional primacy on
277
counterterrorism matters.
For example, in December 2004,
Congress responded to Justice Department requests to amend the

271. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003); accord Marzook, 435
F. Supp. 2d at 749.
272. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”).
273. United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292, 312–17 (4th Cir.) (holding that the
defendant’s compulsory-process-right could be satisfied by his obtaining summaries of
interrogations from the government), amended by 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
274. Cf. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 77–78 (2005) (drawing proposals for statutory
reform from Justice Department testimony).
275. See Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 213
(describing the concept of “underlapping jurisdiction”).
276. Id.
277. Even after a decade of expansions in the federal criminal law of counterterrorism, such
gaps still exist. Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Obama Adviser Outlines Plans To Defeat al
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A12 (describing Vice Admiral William H. McRaven’s
statements concerning a class of terrorism suspects who are detained, initially held on Navy
vessels while the Justice Department identifies any authority to detain, and, in some cases,
released for absence of such authority).
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material-support statute to encompass training in foreign terrorist
278
camps, a need identified through earlier prosecutions. Although
prosecutorial incentives may not always conduce to maximal social
welfare, this instance seems to be one in which they can play a useful
role in raising institutional-design questions worthy of congressional
attention.
To be sure, innovation may be undesirable. Reasonable people
may differ as to whether the aforementioned procedural
modifications conform to constitutional criminal-procedure
commands. Some might argue that the compromises subtly corrode
the Article III criminal-justice system’s hard-earned reputation for
evenhandedness and integrity. Others would go further, claiming that
this reputational cost may undermine public confidence in the justice
system in a way that undermines trust in government, perhaps with
the consequence of dampening public cooperation with police. Those
who see such modifications as violations of core constitutional rights
will accordingly count interjurisdictional competition as a cost and
not a benefit. Resolution of that normative question, however, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Whatever the case, the point here is
that Congress can induce either more or less innovation by either
279
dialing up or down the amount of jurisdictional redundancy. Thus,
redundancy is a means of reducing agency costs.
2. Informed Oversight.
Elected politicians and senior
policymakers can use jurisdictional specification not only as a tool to
control the agency costs associated with adjudicators but also to gain
better insight into how well line agencies responsible for investigation
and interdiction are performing their tasks. Changes to jurisdictional
redundancy may also enable political-branch overseers to gain more
confident knowledge of the threat environment.
Politicians and senior policymakers who allocate resources and
answer other broad policy questions have imperfect knowledge both
278. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 6602, 118 Stat. 3638, 3761 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339D (2006)) (establishing a crime for
receiving “military-type training” from a “designated terrorist organization”); see also Aiding
Terrorists: An Examination of the Material Support Statute: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 12 (2004) (statement of Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (stating that “training to commit terror under certain
circumstances may not be a crime, which just stands logic on its head,” and urging a change in
the law).
279. Whitford, supra note 189, at 164 (noting how interagency competition can “reveal[]
information”).
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of the scale of the terrorism threat and of the performance of line
security agencies. Because much of these agencies’ threat information
derives from the national-security apparatus, the two kinds of
uncertainty are likely correlated. The sixteen intelligence agencies
cooperate in periodic production of a National Strategy for
280
Counterterrorism for the White House. But it may be hard for
Congress and the White House to know whether to discount the
claims and assessments made by the intelligence community—and if
281
so, in which direction to do the discounting. As a consequence,
democratic principles may be especially vulnerable to the whims of
their putative agents in the national-security domain when it comes to
evaluating those agents’ performances. The less trustworthy the
agents, the less reliable the principal’s epistemic base.
Jurisdictional design provides ways for policymakers to elicit
information about agency performance to make more informed
judgments. Two potential mechanisms merit highlighting here. First,
forcing an agency to justify its initial detention decisions before a
neutral and independent decisionmaker may supply information
282
about how accurate the agency is in identifying terrorist risks. A
demand for external verification also may have a disciplining effect in
anticipation of front-end agency decisions. An agent that is aware
that its decisions must be justified after the fact has an incentive to
exercise more care than an agent subject to no post hoc control. To
that end, it may be desirable to supplement the internal
determination offered by the immigration service or the military with
a procedurally robust forum independent of the agency making the
threshold detention decision—such as an Article III court. Provided
that the independent adjudicator and the investigating agency do not
share “strongly correlated biases,” senior policymakers could secure
some insight into how accurate the agency is in its threat assessments
283
by looking at how often the agency prevails upon review. A high
280. E.g., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (2011), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.
281. Consider, for example, the debates about estimates of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
282. Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1145 (1990) (“If Congress observes that an agency has a particularly
poor litigating record in the federal courts, it may take corrective action . . . .”).
283. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1422, 1464 (2011); see also Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free
Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 625–30 (1992) (showing that a group of
decisionmakers with a shared school of thought may have a lower probability of making a
correct decision than any one decisionmaker alone).
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rate of reversal would, all else being equal, signal a systemic problem.
This kind of stacking of internal with external process may be an
appropriate tactic for legislators to adopt if, for example, Congress is
concerned that some agents are “zealots” who pursue their mission
284
without regard to false positives.
Second, and alternatively, senior policymakers might exploit
jurisdictional redundancy by drawing inferences from how agencies
choose among forums. Procedural hurdles can serve as “costly
signal[s]” to political overseers about the underlying value that their
285
agencies attach to different outcomes. An agency decision to opt for
the most procedurally onerous pathway is evidence that the agency
has engaged in a diligent and thorough investigation and is confident
about its conclusion. The choice of a costly forum thereby allows
overseers to “draw[] inferences about the costs the agency incurred”
in detaining a suspect and about “how valuable” the agency believes
286
its detention decision to be. An agency’s persistent decision to
employ more procedurally onerous pathways may suggest that it has
greater confidence in its own detention decisions. By contrast, a
choice to employ a less procedurally demanding path may be
evidence that an agency is less confident about its judgment or that
the agency is slacking in a way that may be systematically undesirable.
Senior policymakers can make such inferences only when two
conditions are met. Agencies must have a choice between high- and
low-process avenues. Further, agencies also must have some motive
to conform to elected officials’ preferences—for example, to
demonstrate competence and thereby secure future flows of funding.
Jurisdictional redundancy enables these conditions to be met. In so
doing, it creates a body of evidence—the pattern of choices made by
agencies as among different adjudicative pathways—that provides
political overseers with useful information about whether agencies

284. See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy
Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 874, 886 (2007) (arguing that
agencies will be staffed by individuals with outlying policy preferences in comparison to those
held by members of Congress).
285. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 771–75 (2006) (“[T]he costly signaling theory of hard look
judicial review postulates that when courts scrutinize agency records, they are drawing
inferences about the costs the agency incurred in generating the record. These cost estimates are
useful to the court because they indicate how valuable the regulation is to the agency.”).
286. Id. at 775. This mechanism works when judicial and agency policy preferences are
positively correlated. Id. at 779.
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are expending effort on accuracy as opposed to, say, maximizing the
287
sheer volume of detention.
Congress’s use of jurisdictional redundancy as a mechanism to
elicit information about agency performance also has doctrinal
implications. Many commentators have argued that judicial deference
to agency judgments of law and fact is warranted especially in the
288
national-security context. But this deference may have a perverse
effect. If the political branches obtain information about the
reliability of agency judgments through robust judicial review of
detention decisions, judicial deference will likely align agencies’ and
courts’ biases in a way that eliminates epistemic gain. Deference, in
other words, saps the information-forcing effects of judicial review
not only directly, by undermining courts’ willingness to identify
instances in which the agency has erred, but also indirectly, by
disabling the agency from demonstrating its own credibility through
its choice of forum for adjudicating terrorism suspects. The
persistence of jurisdictional redundancy therefore suggests that
deference to agency findings in national-security cases may
sometimes be systemically costly.
D. Intelligence Gathering and Deterrence
The second indirect effect of jurisdictional choice on outcomes
arises through its effect on information flows. Institutions are usefully
seen as “systems for managing information” because they provide
mechanisms to aggregate information, generate incentives to gather

287. There are many contexts in which Congress expressly mandates the production of data
about the rate at which agencies employ certain tools. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101, § 707, 122 Stat. 2436, 2457–
58 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881f (Supp. III 2010)) (mandating biannual reports to Congress).
The animating logic of such reporting requirements is that Congress needs to have data about
different statutory tools’ being employed to make judgments about how to tailor government
powers in the future. My argument on detention is that data about the comparative use of
different forums may provide Congress with information about the kinds of persons being
detained and the effort being expended by agencies on such persons. This information may
allow Congress, for example, to infer that it needs to impose more or less onerous regulations
on the agency’s front-end interdiction powers.
288. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1170, 1218 (2007) (“In our view, the executive should [with respect to the war on
terror and the AUMF] usually be entitled to interpret genuinely ambiguous provisions as it sees
fit, subject to the qualifications that its interpretations must be reasonable and that Congress
must specifically authorize intrusions on constitutionally sensitive interests.”.
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and convey information, and serve as platforms to disseminate data.
A “failure to consider how legal institutions affect incentives to
acquire information may lead to incomplete or misguided
290
recommendations for institutional reform.” This Section explores
two effects of institutional design that are related to information
flows. First, it examines the negative effect of redundancy on the
incentives of agents to gather accurate information in timely and costeffective ways. Second, it discusses the inverse correlation between
jurisdictional redundancy and marginal deterrence. In both cases, the
effect under discussion can be discerned whenever a low-process
venue is added to the mix. They are both properly considered
redundancy-related effects because they arise through the addition of
low-process venues to the status quo. Ignoring such effects would
implausibly omit certain costs associated with creating new
redundancy, biasing the analysis in favor of such overlap. And, to
anticipate an argument developed in Part IV, both become acutely
relevant in the context of proposals to eliminate jurisdictional
overlap.
1. Information Acquisition.
An underexplored effect of
institutional design is its effect on the incentives of agents to gather
accurate information in timely and cost-effective ways. The
information necessary to create accurate counterterrorism measures
is costly to acquire. The government’s agents must therefore expend
effort to obtain information. But there is no guarantee that even
experienced intelligence agencies will allocate resources wisely. For
example, on the eve of 9/11, the CIA’s al Qaeda unit was relatively
291
underfunded. Jurisdictional specification matters because “public
decisionmakers’ expertise about policy decisions is often endogenous
(produced by factors internal to the legal-institutional system) rather
292
than exogenous.” Changes to the contours of jurisdiction have
consequences for the stock of expertise within government because
those contours influence the upstream incentives of investigating

289. ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT
SMALL 9 (2007).
290. Stephenson, supra note 283, at 1426 (exploring connections between institutional
design and information acquisition); see also Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 23, at 716–17 (examining
the effects of the “architecture” of an organization—i.e., “how the decision-making authority
and ability [are] distributed within a system”).
291. TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA 478 (2007).
292. Stephenson, supra note 283, at 1426.
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officials as to how and when to gather evidence. They do so in large
part because different forums permit detention based on different
kinds of factual showings of dangerousness—thereby inducing
different levels of investment in information acquisition.
Consider the following mechanism linking jurisdictional
redundancy to decisions about how information is acquired.
Government officials’ strong incentives to prevent terrorist events
give them powerful motives to avoid false negatives. But officials’
attitudes to false positives are more ambiguous. It would be surprising
if officials systematically prized liberty over security goals. It might be
that fiscal constraints provide officials with a reason to avoid false
positives, but this possibility seems unlikely. And officials generally
293
do not share the fiscal goals of government. Even if they did, the
fiscal constraints upon national-security agencies seem in practice
exiguous. Scant evidence suggests that the war on terrorism will be
penny-pinched to death. Several Supreme Court and appellate court
judgments also suggest that officials have little reason to fear that
excessive security-related detentions will result in personal tort
294
liability. All else being equal, it therefore seems likely that officials’
incentives will be asymmetrical. More care will be taken to avoid false
negatives than to avoid false positives. This dynamic will, in turn, lead
officials to select investigative tools that err on the side of false
negatives and not false positives. They may rely, for example, on
coercive interrogation methods that minimize false negatives but tend
to produce an undesirable number of false positives, rather than
relying on more time-consuming methods that limit both.
Jurisdictional redundancy can exacerbate this asymmetrical set
of incentives. Consider a situation in which officials know that the
government has the option of selecting among different forums with
procedural constraints of varying intensity. Given that knowledge, the
officials may opt to use methods that predictably yield high numbers
of false positives in the expectation that the low-procedure pathway

293. See Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370–71 (2000) (expressing skepticism about the
incentive effects of government tort judgments).
294. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (dismissing for failure to state a
claim a damages action by a former immigration detainee against two high-level federal
officials); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing a suit because
of the insufficiency of the allegations and the absence of a Bivens remedy); El-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s dismissal based on the
“state secrets” doctrine).
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can be used to process those cases. For example, if officials were to
know that the government exercised a choice between Article III
criminal process and enemy-combatant detention in practice—either
as a consequence of simultaneous overlap or sequential overlap—
they would have no reason to correct for a skewed collection of
information. They would rely on less accurate forms of evidence,
knowing that the weakest cases will be triaged into a military forum in
which evidentiary rules are thinner. As a result, jurisdictional
redundancy may increase the rate of false positives indirectly by
changing the incentives of investigating officials. This effect obtains
only, however, if redundancy is used rather than latent. When
redundancy largely lies fallow—as it historically has—it is not clear
that it has a deleterious effect on incentives in this way.
By contrast, when investigating agents know that the status of a
suspect will likely be determined in a forum that accepts only highquality information, they have a greater incentive to collect
information that does not suffer from pro-detention biases. In this
way, the elimination of jurisdictional overlap in favor of a highprocess channel may increase the accuracy of detention decisions.
Eliminating a high-process forum in favor of a low-process forum, on
the other hand, has no such salutary accuracy effect.
Jurisdictional redundancy’s effect on information acquisition
may be undesirable even if false positives are not seen as having a
significant welfare cost. When officials know that their judgments will
not be subject to stringent ex post verification, they also may allocate
their investigative resources in undesirable ways. For example, they
may focus investigative resources not on populations that present the
greatest risk but on populations that promise the largest number of
detentions, understood to include both true and false positives, so as
to demonstrate their proficiency and effectiveness.
Furthermore, over time the absence of disciplining post hoc
review may have the effect of corroding investigative skills. That is,
the absence of disciplining review either by an Article III or an
Article I adjudicator over time will result in a withering of
investigative skills, as agencies increasingly resort to overinclusive
295. This is another example of the general problem that arises when agents are delegated
multiple tasks and have preferences as between those tasks that are inconsistent with the
preferences of the principal. See generally Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask
Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 24 (1991) (analyzing an agent’s decisionmaking process when the agent
has more than one task to perform).
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investigative techniques. There is some evidence for this dynamic in
the criminal law. For example, Professor Jonathan Simon argues that
widening opportunities for severe criminal punishments based on
possession of small amounts of narcotics has dulled police officers’
296
incentives to develop or retain investigative skills. Making arrests
for possession offenses is far easier, Simon contends, than investing in
hard and potentially unrewarding investigations. In the nationalsecurity context, these asymmetrical preferences for investigative
techniques may be corrected by directing cases into a forum with
stringent exclusionary rules. For example, an absolute rule against
evidence gained by torture or cruel and inhumane treatment by either
U.S. officials or other states’ officials might induce long-term
investments in intelligence relationships and methods that do not rely
on such practices and that gain more reliably valuable information.
Jurisdictional redundancy’s effect on information acquisition
moves through the channels of dissipated skills and lost opportunities.
Accordingly, this effect is hard to quantify, just like the analogous deskilling effect in law enforcement. Government insiders, of course,
are unlikely to supply candid assessments of the problem. Indeed,
they may not even discern it. Although it is hard to estimate,
redundancy’s impact on incentives to develop and retain investigative
skills may nonetheless undermine policy outcomes in the long term.
2. Marginal Deterrence. One possible function of a terroristdetention regime is to deter potential terrorist recruits. Jurisdictional
redundancy can create impediments to effective marginal deterrence.
To obtain optimal deterrence, “[a] system of punishment should
impose heavier penalties for more serious crimes in order to coerce
297
criminals into committing less serious crimes.”
Absent the
calibration of punishment in light of the severity of the offense,
marginal deterrence is lost. As George Stigler famously explained, “If

296. Jonathan Simon, Recovering the Craft of Policing: Wrongful Convictions, the War on
Crime, and the Problem of Security, in WHEN LAW FAILS: MAKING SENSE OF MISCARRIAGES
OF JUSTICE 115, 117 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009) (“[T]he culture of
investigation inside American policing has become reliant on forced confessions and other
forms of ‘junk evidence’ as a by-product of its long, dirty war on drugs.” (footnote omitted)).
297. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1066 (2009).
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the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well
298
take $5,000.”
The law of counterterrorism is already rife with rules that
confound marginal deterrence. For example, the material-support
statute encompasses a vast domain of conduct related to FTOs, from
the donation of de minimis funds to the construction and delivery of
explosive devices. The statute’s penalty provisions impose a
299
maximum fifteen-year sentence. A potential life sentence may be
authorized if the material support can be connected to a specific act
300
of violence that results in loss of life. This use of a high and fixed
penalty for a large set of varied acts has a perverse consequence.
Those who give a small amount of material support may reasonably
believe that because they are already exposed to such significant
301
punishments, like Stigler’s thief, they have little else left to lose. The
same problem arises with enemy-combatant detention. Recall that
under the precedent of the D.C. Circuit, the government may detain
as an enemy combatant almost anyone who acts in a coordinated
302
fashion with al Qaeda. Potential sympathizers with al Qaeda, once
they have interacted with the group, have no incentive to avoid
accelerated participation with it. Paradoxically, this phenomenon
might diminish recruitment costs for terrorist organizations that can
generate diffuse sympathy for their ultimate aims but that have
difficulty persuading fellow travelers to make serious sacrifices for the
303
cause. To say the least, it is an odd result when the law works to
encourage people to deepen their links with terrorism.
A possible objection to this marginal-deterrence logic would
begin from the premise that terrorists are not rational actors and so
are not amenable to deterrence effects. Anecdotal evidence from
terrorism cases might be marshaled to suggest the dominance of

298. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527
(1970); see also Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as
a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (1985) (“[R]aising the sanction with the expected
harmfulness of acts gives parties who are not deterred incentives to do less harm.”).
299. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006).
300. Id.
301. This holds constant the likelihood of interdiction.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 172–73.
303. Al Qaeda in particular has suffered severe “[r]ecruitment difficulties” since 9/11.
CHARLES KURZMAN, THE MISSING MARTYRS: WHY THERE ARE SO FEW MUSLIM
TERRORISTS 11–12 (2011). Sympathy for the organization’s goals appears to be much more
widespread than willingness to act on its behalf.
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And
ideological motives over rational strategic calculations.
translating moral antipathy toward terrorism into the assumption that
terrorists themselves are beyond the bounds of rational action is also
tempting. But both of these causal inferences should be resisted.
Empirical studies of terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, show that
the objection to the notion of terrorist rationality is dramatically
305
overstated. Those studies demonstrate that individual terrorists are
overwhelmingly rational, in the sense of making judgments about the
appropriate means to their chosen ends, however morally
objectionable their goals or methods might be. To translate
reflexively a commonly shared moral repugnance toward acts of
terrorism into an empirical belief about the underlying means-end
rationality of its perpetrators is to mistake an ethical judgment for a
judgment about the mechanisms of the social world in a way that
hinders understanding and prediction.
To summarize, jurisdictional redundancy can amplify and extend
counterterrorism law’s marginal-deterrence problem. Just as the
sweep of the material-support statute or AUMF-related detention
blunts the possibility of marginal deterrence, so too jurisdictional
redundancy between the Article III criminal process and military
detention of enemy combatants diminishes marginal deterrence.
Preservation of marginal-deterrence effects may thus provide a post
hoc justification for the decisions of both the Bush and Obama
administrations to rely almost exclusively on criminal law within the
United States and to avoid the use of military detention.
*

*

*

In this Part, I have tried to illuminate the complexity of the
institutional-design question in forum choice for terrorism suspects.
To that end, I have described several direct and indirect mechanisms
that link jurisdictional choices to socially desirable and undesirable
outcomes. If nothing else, my aim here has been to show that a
narrow focus on procedural detail and substantive rules is insufficient
to understand and answer the forum-choice question. Especially to
the extent that the procedure and substance of diverse jurisdictional

304. See Monica Davey, Would-Be Plane Bomber Pleads Guilty, Ending Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2011, at A17 (recounting a plan by a terrorism defendant made in the midst of trial,
seemingly on ideological and not consequentialist grounds).
305. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic
Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 879 n.243 (2011).
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pathways appear to be converging, the mechanisms I have identified
here may be the more appropriate locus of inquiry.
IV. DEFENDING JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY
Part III develops a typology of costs and benefits related to
jurisdictional redundancy. This Part applies those arguments to two
prominent proposals that were under discussion in early 2012, at the
time of this Article’s preparation. Both proposals largely hold the
designs of specific institutions constant but streamline forum choice.
One would force near-exclusive employment of Article III criminal
process, whereas the other would insist on the exclusive use of
military commissions in a large set of cases. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that either one or another of these proposals
must be desirable, I suggest that both streamlining proposals have
underappreciated costs. The dominant jurisdictional architecture
since 9/11, in which redundancy has been rife but selectively invoked,
may seem ad hoc, but that status quo may have considerable
underappreciated virtues. As a result, a move toward either one of
the two posited versions of exclusive jurisdiction would be unlikely to
307
produce desirable outcomes in either the short or the long term.
As an initial matter, I shall state clearly the limits of the analysis
developed in this Part. Both of the proposed reforms discussed below
are distinctive in that they involve the almost wholesale excision of
redundancy from the extant jurisdictional system. They are, in other
words, corner solutions to the forum-choice problem: either no
Article III jurisdiction or no military jurisdiction. That proposals are
radical in this way, rather than finely tailored, creates an opportunity
for analysis even in the absence of more comprehensive institutional
and empirical information. Even if reaching a precise assessment
about any and all marginal change to the detention system is too
epistemically demanding, making a judgment about whether a radical

306. See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 1080–81 (“[T]he two systems . . . have
converged on procedural and especially substantive criteria for detention.”).
307. To reach an accurate assessment of how eliminating redundancy influences outcomes,
it would be necessary to isolate that change from other effects in order to avoid confounding
results. One would have to alter redundancy without altering the median quantum of process
used in the system. One of the proposals discussed below—recourse to Article III courts only—
roughly has this property. But the other—recourse to military forums only—does not. That
alternative would lead on average to a drop in the procedural rigor of hearings. Even controlling
for the change in median procedural rigor, however, I argue that the latter change still would be
undesirable.
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transformation toward either one of these two corner solutions would
likely yield net gains or net losses is nonetheless feasible. Working
within the constraints of available data and employing what I hope
are plausible and uncontroversial empirical claims, I contend that it is
possible to say, at least as a first rough approximation, whether these
particular jurisdictional-design recommendations are likely to be
socially desirable or not. My aim here is not, however, to provide a
comprehensive evaluation of all conceivable adjustments to
terrorism-related jurisdiction. I therefore make no claim here about
optimal jurisdictional specification.
A. Limiting Jurisdiction to Article III Tribunals
The first, albeit less politically feasible, proposal on forum choice
is to channel all terrorism suspects into Article III courts or, if they
308
cannot be tried in that forum, to release them. Advocates of this
approach tend to categorically disfavor military commissions and
contend that the Article III criminal process is the sole legitimate and
proper adjudicative venue. The scope of such proposals is not always
free of ambiguity. For example, it is not always clear whether the
proposals would apply without any regard to geographical
circumstances and, in particular, whether they would apply to
battlefield captures. Politically savvy proponents of “Article III court
only” proposals, however, are unlikely to argue that fighters seized on
an active battlefield while deploying arms against American soldiers
must always be channeled into a civilian forum. For the sake of
evaluating this kind of proposal, I therefore assume that these
proponents would allow the use of military forums in a narrow class
of battlefield circumstances.
Would such a rationalization of extinguishing jurisdictional
redundancy yield positive welfare effects? To be sure, the elimination
of non-Article III jurisdiction would have benefits. It would, for
example, reduce the number of false positives—as its advocates
hope—and would also mitigate the demoralization costs among the
public that are created by the specter of multiple adjudications. It

308. E.g., Ratner & Lobel, supra note 16; see also Neil A. Lewis, Try Detainees or Free
Them, 3 Senators Urge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2003, at A14 (“They may not have any rights
under the Geneva Conventions as far as I’m concerned, . . . but they have rights under various
human rights declarations. And one of them is the right not to be detained indefinitely.”
(quoting Senator John McCain) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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might even force agencies to engage in more accurate information
gathering ex ante.
But it is also likely that the proposal would have effects that run
counter to the intentions of its advocates. Extinguishing the
redundancy that obtains from military forums would eliminate the
possibility of positive jurisdictional arbitrage and the use of a second
forum as a safety valve, at least in the absence of an immigration
violation on the suspect’s part. Doing so raises the stakes in any given
trial. When there is reason to believe that a suspect presents a
credible risk but the admissible evidence is weak for reasons
unrelated to the government’s investigative effort, a judge is under
implicit or explicit pressure to bend procedural rules in deference to
the government. This situation does not necessarily generate pressure
to innovate in positive ways. Rather, it may translate into pressure
upon risk-averse judges to grant more leeway to the government.
More deference from judges would undermine the checking function
Article III judges are supposed to play in terrorism cases. It would
also compromise the information-forcing role of judicial review. Such
pressures also may yield procedural rollback not only in terrorismrelated cases but across the body of criminal litigation to the
detriment of criminal suspects. Criminal-procedure rights, after all,
are transubstantive, and courts may bend generally applicable rules
rather than allowing suspected terrorists to evade punishment or
crafting ad hoc terrorism exceptions to constitutional rights. Although
causation is hard to establish, judicial changes to Fourth Amendment
and Confrontation Clause protections after 2001 may fairly be seen as
evidence of precisely this sort of transubstantive slackening of
309
constitutional criminal-procedure protections.
The Article III-only proposal might be self-defeating in another
way. By eliminating the insurance option created by redundancy and
by streamlining existing reserve capacity, the proposal may make the
jurisdictional system as a whole more vulnerable to failure in the
teeth of an exogenous shock. The failure of such a system to interdict
a terrorist who goes on to commit a serious attack would quite likely
induce a political reaction that would undo the reformers’ goals.

309. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157–60 (2011) (interpreting expansively the
emergency exception to the Confrontation Clause); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S.
177, 190–91 (2004) (holding that statutes requiring suspects to identify themselves during police
investigations did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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The gain from elimination of a military option that is presently in
310
rare use may be smaller than first appears for other reasons. Recall
that several redundancy-related costs have concave cost curves in
relation to the extent to which redundancy is used. Absent heavy use,
that is, jurisdictional redundancy may not generate large
demoralization, de-skilling, or marginal-deterrence costs. Hence,
redundancy in relative desuetude may not be as costly as is generally
believed. By contrast, those costs with a convex curve—such as the
high startup costs of military commissions and any attendant politicallegitimacy losses—already will largely have accrued at the point that
redundancy is eliminated from the system. The costs turn not on the
use of a forum, but on its creation. Under such conditions, this second
kind of costs represents what economists would call a set of sunk
costs, which should be ignored for the purpose of forward-looking
design decisions. Put these cost curves together, and it becomes
apparent that eliminating rarely-used military jurisdiction may not
bring large welfare gains because the costs of such jurisdiction have
either been irredeemably expended or not yet accrued. In short,
attention to the cost curves of redundancy-related harms suggests that
it would likely be inefficient to expend the costs of moving from the
status quo ante of pervasive but scantily used redundancy to one of
exclusive Article III jurisdiction.
At the same time that it makes only ambiguous movement
toward its putative libertarian goal, this proposal would have several
unintended and undesirable policy effects: First, it would potentially
reduce accuracy by eliminating opportunities to correct first-round
false negatives. Second, it would eliminate competition-related
incentives among forums that have fostered procedural innovation.
Third, it would extinguish the government’s choice as to whether or
not to use a costly procedure in a given case. By cutting off a choice
that has worked as a source of information for congressional
overseers, the proposal may increase agency costs. Whereas under the
existing scheme Congress can assess what proportion of cases are
prepared on the basis of robust and relatively reliable evidence, as
opposed to thinner records, in a world in which Article III jurisdiction
were to be mandated, agencies simply would not press some cases.
Any informational effects created by forum choice would evaporate.

310. See supra Part I.C.
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In short, the gains from this proposed reform are far smaller than
appear at first blush. Indeed, the proposal might even be selfdefeating along the libertarian metric that its supporters purport to
celebrate above other values.
B. Limiting Jurisdiction to Military Venues
The second kind of jurisdictional reform proposal, which aims to
mandate the use of a military forum for some class of terrorism
311
suspects, fares no better. Like Article III-only proposals, it would
fail to promote the security goals of its proponents while inflicting
even more serious collateral harms on the ability of the detention
system to promote desirable outcomes.
Proposals in this vein differ in their proposed scope and have a
checkered history that culminated in the 2012 NDAA. In March 2011,
Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, then-chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee, introduced the Detainee Security
312
Act of 2011. Section 4(a) of that bill would have required the
president to hold in “military custody” any newly detained person
313
“eligible for detention pursuant to the [AUMF].” Representative
McKeon summarized his position with a slogan: “No more
mirandizing [sic] terrorists. No more trials in downtown
314
Manhattan.” His explanation did not, however, clarify the precise
metes and bounds of his bill. Because there is more than residual

311. Congress has in the past made jurisdictional changes respecting detainees’ access to
federal court. See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, § 1005(e),
119 Stat. 2739, 2741–43 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006))
(stripping statutory habeas jurisdiction in challenges of Guantánamo detentions). The proposals
discussed here would limit the choice set of the government and not the choice set of the
detainee.
312. Detainee Security Act of 2011, H.R. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
313. Id. sec. 4(a), § 130e(a). Representative McKeon also introduced the Enemy Belligerent
Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, H.R. 4892, 111th Cong. (2010). Section 4
of that bill would have barred the use of any “funds appropriated or otherwise made available
to the Department of Justice” to prosecute a person falling into a category roughly homologous
to enemy combatant. Id. § 4; see also id. § 6(10) (defining the category of “unprivileged enemy
belligerent”).
314. Daniel Halper, Rep. Buck McKeon’s Foreign Policy Address, WKLY. STANDARD BLOG
(Nov. 15, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/rep-buck-mckeons-foreignpolicy-address_516881.html.
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uncertainty about the scope of the AUMF, the domain of cases that
315
the McKeon proposal would have encompassed is not clear.
A variant of the McKeon proposal was introduced in the Senate
in October 2011. Senator Kelly Ayotte unsuccessfully proposed a
floor amendment to then-pending military-appropriations legislation
that would have barred any appropriations for the criminal trials of
individuals “determined to be” either members of or part of al Qaeda
or an affiliate or otherwise a participant in “an attack or attempted
316
attack” on the United States.
Both the initial McKeon and the Ayotte proposals would have
eliminated all jurisdictional redundancy in some class of cases—and
my aim here is to analyze the welfare effects of such a move. It is
worth emphasizing that subsection D of the 2012 NDAA, in which an
eventual compromise was struck, has a very different effect from
either the McKeon or the Ayotte provision. Section 1022 of the 2012
NDAA, to be sure, appears to be a mandatory-military-detention rule
on first reading. But this impression is misleading. That provision
instead imposes procedural obligations on the executive, but it does
not, in fact, require long-term military detention in any case. For this
reason, that provision leaves open the central questions discussed in
this Article.
Section 1022 applies to a subset of individuals who may be
detained in military custody under the AUMF if they are “captured in
317
the course of hostilities” authorized by the AUMF. It commands
315. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text. The McKeon proposal recrafts the
scope of the AUMF in section 5 but does not, in so doing, resolve the question of geographic
scope.
316. 157 CONG. REC. S6729–30 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2011) (amendment text); see also 157
CONG. REC. S6845–46 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2011) (vote count). The Ayotte amendment is poorly
drafted even if one agrees with its policy goals. For example, its reference to
“attack[s] . . . against the United States,” 157 CONG. REC. S6730 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2011), could
be read to reach any assault on a federal official, whether a postal worker or an FBI agent.
Senator Ayotte has defended her proposal on the ground that “informing an enemy combatant
of his or her ‘right to remain silent’ is contrary to the essential goal of obtaining critical
intelligence necessary to finding other terrorists and preventing future attacks.” Kelly Ayotte,
Opinion, Job 1: Stopping Future Terror Attacks, CONCORD MONITOR, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.
concordmonitor.com/article/288349/job-1-stopping-future-terror-attacks. It is hard to see how
an objection to the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which operates before a
trial occurs and which has a public-safety exception, conduces to a categorical objection to
Article III trials. Senator Ayotte’s justifications for her proposal also entirely fail to address why
it is desirable to eliminate optionality from the existing system.
317. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 2012), Pub. L.
No. 112-81, § 1022(a)(2) (2011), PL 112-81 (Westlaw) (defining the scope of application as
reaching anyone who is “a member of, or part of, al-Qaeda or an associated force that acts in
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the “Armed Forces of the United States” to “hold” that person “in
318
military custody pending disposition under the law of war.” A
separate statutory provision defines “disposition under the laws of
war” to include “[d]etention under the law of war without trial until
the end of the hostilities authorized by the [AUMF];” militarycommission trial; “trial by an alternative court or competent tribunal
having lawful jurisdiction;” or “[t]ransfer to the custody of control of
the person’s country of origin, any other foreign country, or any other
319
foreign entity.” The provision directs the executive to promulgate
procedures for accomplishing such disposition, but it also contains
three caveats. First, it “does not extend to citizens of the United
States” or to “a lawful resident alien of the United States on the basis
of conduct taking place within the United States, except to the extent
320
permitted by the Constitution of the United States.” Second, the
president may waive the mandatory rule by filing a written
certification with Congress that the “waiver is in the national security
321
interests of the United States.” Finally, § 1021 does not “affect the
existing criminal enforcement and national security authorities of the
322
[FBI].”
Section 1022 does not accomplish the McKeon-Ayotte goal of
mandating military detention, even setting aside its exceptions for
323
citizens and some lawful resident aliens, for at least two reasons.
First, § 1021 defines “disposition under [the] law of war” to include
triage to any of the forums discussed in this Article and includes

coordination with or pursuant to the direction of al-Qaeda” and who has also “participated in
the course of planning or carrying out an attack or attempted attack against the United States or
its coalition partners”). Section 1022(a)(2) thus describes a subset of the persons who can be
detained under the detention authority listed in section 1021(b), which is drafted in the
disjunctive and not the conjunctive.
318. NDAA 2012 § 1022(a)(1). The term “hostilities” is defined in the Military Commissions
Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948a–950t (Supp. IV 2010), as “any conflict subject to the laws of war”,
id. § 948a(9). This definition is ambiguous because it is not clear what the relevant unit of
analysis is for conflicts. For example, should one look at the Afghan theater as a single conflict,
as the Supreme Court did when considering the lawful duration of a battlefield detention?
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that Hamdi could
be held only until the end of the Afghan conflict in which he had been seized). Or should one
consider all U.S.-al Qaeda interactions as a single conflict? The statute is not clear on this point.
319. NDAA 2012 § 1021(c)(1)–(4).
320. Id. § 1022(b)(1)–(2).
321. Id. § 1022(a)(4).
322. Id. § 1022(d).
323. I set aside here the possibility that the term “hostilities” should be read narrowly. See
supra note 318.
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immigration proceedings and Article III criminal trials as “competent
324
tribunal[s] having lawful jurisdiction.” This definition means that a
person can be designated as fitting under § 1022 and immediately
funneled into a nonmilitary forum without having spent any actual
time in military custody. In effect, all Congress has done in these
cases is to interpose another level of bureaucracy in the detention
process. Although bureaucratic controls or procedural rules can
sometimes be justified as means of eliciting information or preventing
325
arbitrary actions, § 1022 has neither of these effects. To the
contrary, it is hard to see it playing any useful function warranting its
costs in cases in which Article III trial is the chosen disposition.
Second, there is no reason that a § 1021 determination need ever
be made in some significant number of cases. Critically, the statute
does not impose a temporal constraint on how quickly the
determination needs to be made once a suspect has come to the
government’s attention. To read the statute to implicitly impose such
a time limit would not only supplement the text with an atextual
triggering rule, but it would also undermine “the existing criminal
enforcement and national security authorities of the Federal Bureau
326
of Investigation [and] other domestic law enforcement agenc[ies].”
Many suspects who fall within the scope of § 1022 inevitably will have
been identified in the course of FBI investigations. To require the
Bureau to cease abruptly an ongoing investigation, detain a suspect,
and hand him over to the military, even if agents reasonably believe
that pursuit of the investigation will lead them to more important
suspects, is to compel an obviously counterproductive result. The
ability of agents to pursue such investigations to the point of
negotiating plea deals with such persons obviates the need for a
§ 1022 determination. Rather, civilian law enforcement would move
directly to an enumerated “disposition under the laws of war”—i.e., a
plea colloquy before a federal judge. Assuming compliance with the
statute’s ultimate command of appropriately disposing of suspects in
an enumerated fashion, it is hard to see why the statute should be
read in such cases to impose a mechanical “determination” that can
only have the effect of disrupting the successful attainment of law324. NDAA 2012 § 1021(c)(3).
325. No argument was made during the legislative debates over the 2012 NDAA to the
effect that government choices to use Article III should be made marginally more costly
through the imposition of a layer of bureaucracy. Nor is it easy to discern any colorable policy
justification for section 1022’s effect along these lines.
326. NDAA 2012 § 1022(d).
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enforcement goals. In sum, mandatory military detention is not yet
the law of the land for any given class of suspects.
But would such a mandate of military detention improve net
social welfare by increasing the accuracy and reducing the cost of
terrorist-detention systems? The answer is no. Like proposals to
channel all cases into Article III forums, proposals to make military
detention exclusive would generate perverse and self-defeating
results. Several negative downstream effects of mandatory military
detention are worth stressing to illustrate this point.
First, it is ironic that one of the most important effects of
mandating a military forum would be to eliminate the existing
measure of sequential overlap that insures against false negatives.
The evidence presented in Part I suggests that sequential overlap has
been a largely successful strategy for eliminating false negatives. In
tension with its advocates’ goals, mandatory military detention may in
this way eliminate a design feature of existing forum-choice
arrangements that dampens the risk of a false negative. Oddly,
proponents of military forums would eliminate the insurance effect of
redundancy on the basis of precious little evidence that the Article III
criminal system generates a significant rate of false negatives and
some evidence that military adjudication has failed to sort accurately
the pool of captured detainees, leading to the release of persons who
327
have gone on to commit further acts of violence. That is, there is
very little evidence that Article III forums have failed to supply
convictions in appropriate cases, and there is some evidence that
military screening techniques have been inaccurate.
Second, eliminating sequential overlap would vitiate the salutary
function played by redundancy as insurance against underlap. Even
when a military forum has been used initially, Article III criminal
jurisdiction can still play a backstopping role against legal risk, as
demonstrated in the Padilla and al-Marri litigations. The history of
military commissions to date suggests that this kind of legal risk is

327. For a careful analysis of evidence of recidivism by enemy combatants suggesting that
the worry is somewhat overstated, see Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Guantanamo:
Who Really ‘Returned to the Battlefield?,’ NEW AM. FOUND. (July 20, 2009), http://
counterterrorism.newamerica.net/publications/policy/guantanamo_who_really_returned_battle
field (discussing recidivism rates among enemy combatants who have been detained). It is also
important to observe that what is commonly called recidivism may be nothing of the kind.
Instead, it may be evidence of what might be termed a criminogenic effect from enemycombatant detention. In other words, the fact that those who are erroneously detained at first
are exposed to radicalizing influences within a detention facility and then released.
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hardly minimal. That is, it seems plausible to imagine that a
significant number of al Qaeda suspects who are alleged to have had a
leadership or logistical role in past terrorist attacks, but not an
operational role, will be amenable to trial in a military commission
only for inchoate offenses such as “providing material support” or
328
“terrorism.” Significant uncertainty remains and has been flagged
by a plurality of the Supreme Court, as to whether these offenses are
indeed violations of the laws of war that may be tried by military
329
commissions. Although the Court of Military Commissions Review
has held that material support is a war crime, its opinion may be
330
vulnerable.
Proponents
of
exclusive
military-commission
jurisdiction thus press their case at a time when the constitutionally
permissible ambit of those tribunals is unclear and when it is possible
that the latter will be circumscribed to exclude the allegations against
many detainees. In the absence of certainty that a single forum can
constitutionally adjudicate all known terrorism cases, mandating that
331
cases be tried in one forum seems singularly unwise.
Third, the proposal would mitigate the epistemic benefits of
existing simultaneous redundancy much in the same way that Article
III-only proposals would. It would eliminate the information-forcing
effects of forum choice, undermining the ability of Congress to draw
inferences from the jurisdictional options selected by its agents in the
bureaucracy. And it would furthermore extinguish competition
among forums that has previously fostered procedural innovation.
Fourth, mandating use of a military forum would directly and
immediately amplify the rate of false positives by exchanging the use
of a lower-process forum such as enemy-combatant detention for a

328. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(24) (Supp. IV 2010) (defining the “material support” offense); id.
§ 950t(25) (defining the “terrorism” offense).
329. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 611 (2006) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that
conspiracy offenses are not violations of the laws of war).
330. See United States v. Hamdan, No. CMCR 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *44 (Ct. Mil.
Comm’n Rev. June 24, 2011) (holding that material support was a violation of the laws of war
prior to the enactment of military-commissions legislation in 2009); accord United States v. Al
Bahlul, No. CMCR 09-001, 2011 WL 4916373, at *29–53 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Sept. 9, 2011).
These opinions rest their conclusions largely on evidence of international treaties that urge
states to enact municipal criminal statutes and on various domestic criminal laws. It is not clear
that independent evidence of the status of material support under international law is strong, or
even tenable.
331. A more cynical view may be that it is precisely in order to impose moral and
psychological pressure on judges to find military commissions capable of prosecuting materialsupport offenses that proponents of the military-only route are now pressing their case.

HUQ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1504

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/20/2012 12:33 AM

[Vol. 61:1415

higher process forum such as Article III criminal process. Strictly
speaking, this effect is not a consequence of the loss of redundancy
per se. Rather, it follows from the diminished median level of
332
procedural robustness in the detention system. But it is nonetheless
a consequence of the mandatory-military-forum proposals in relation
to the status quo. In the longer term, the inflationary effect of
mandating military process on false positives may be even greater.
Such proposals undermine investigating agencies’ long-term
incentives to preserve investigative expertise and to gather accurate
information. They do so by effectively scaling back restrictions on
morally dubious investigative shortcuts such as the use of cruel and
333
inhumane treatment in interrogations. It is no small irony that what
is touted as a pro-security move would likely inflict serious harm over
time to the government’s capacity to meet security goals through
targeted and effective investigations.
Fifth, mandatory military detention would eviscerate what
remains of marginal deterrence, with similarly perverse
consequences. Rather than dissuading fellow ideologues from more
active support of terrorism, it may well be that the effect of
mandatory military jurisdiction would be to extinguish incentives to
refrain from terrorism once any expression of support had been
made. Strategic terrorist groups will leverage this leveling effect by
broadening the ideological grounds of their appeal. They will seek to
persuade a greater number of potential recruits that their existing
political sympathies already expose them to military detention. This
hypothesis is not wholly without support: studies of past
counterterrorism efforts link the militarization of counterterrorism
334
policy to boosted terrorism recruitment. And a moment’s reflection

332. I am grateful to William Hubbard for pressing me on this distinction.
333. Such methods obviously may raise normative concerns. Without detracting from those
concerns, I mean to set them aside for the purpose of this analysis.
334. A study of British counterterrorism policies in Northern Ireland found that of six highvisibility initiatives, one had had an observable deterrent effect, whereas five had had no
discernible deterrent effect. Two others had had no statistically significant impact, whereas
three of the intrusive policies had been associated with significant increases in violence. Gary
LaFree, Laura Dugan & Raven Korte, The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on
Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models, 47
CRIMINOLOGY 17, 25–35 (2009). Similar effects have been identified in the aftermath of the
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. See Ronald Fischer, Charles Harb, Sarah Al-Sarraf & Omar
Nashabe, Support for Resistance Among Iraqi Students: An Exploratory Study, 30 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 173 (2008) (“The data presented here suggest that support for
violence is strongly influenced by a national struggle against a foreign occupation force.”).
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on the moralistic arguments made on behalf of terrorist causes
suggests that it would be hazardous to assume that a strictly inverse
relationship exists between the state’s use of force and the proclivity
to turn to arms.
Finally, such proposals would impose high demoralization costs
and extinguish constitutional rights related to the criminal process in
at least some class of cases arising in the United States, further
reducing recruitment costs for terrorist groups.
In sum, it is hard to see many, or even any, compensating virtues
of proposals that would eliminate all jurisdictional overlap in favor of
a military venue. Such proposals might provide their advocates in
Congress with a warm glow from the sense of being tough on
terrorism. But the proposals will do little to improve security in the
short term, and in the long term are likely to impose large welfare
costs on future political generations.
C. In Defense of the Status Quo
Change is fashionable for politicians and pundits. But in this
case, the conventional wisdom about the dysfunctionality of existing
forum choices for terrorism suspects may be off the mark. A
comprehensive assessment of the status quo, to be sure, rests on
difficult empirical assessments beyond the grasp of this Article. But
preliminary grounds can be offered for believing that the post-9/11
jurisdictional status quo leverages many of the advantages of
redundancy without incurring some of the related costs. At least in
comparison to corner solutions mandating a single forum, the status
quo does not look so bad.
It is worth recalling that the jurisdictional status quo has largely
335
endured through both a Republican and a Democratic presidency.
Both administrations converged on a status quo in which redundancy
exists but is invoked only infrequently. Both made vigorous use of the
federal criminal and immigration systems. And both preserved the
military option, although neither relied upon it much after 2004,
outside of the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. Notwithstanding
its aggressive, unilateralist image, the Bush administration did not
push the boundaries of jurisdictional choice as far as it could have. It
employed military detention in the United States for only two
335. See Jack Goldsmith, The Cheney Fallacy, NEW REPUBLIC (May 18, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-cheney-fallacy (“The new administration has copied most
of the Bush program, has expanded some of it, and has narrowed only a bit.”).
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suspects and exposed only a handful of suspects to military tribunals.
It thus preserved the benefits of Article III while maintaining military
336
detention in reserve.
Notwithstanding its libertarian rhetoric, the Obama
administration has not abandoned the Bush administration’s
jurisdictional claims. To the contrary, the Obama White House has
337
been careful to preserve operational flexibility. In a September 2011
speech at Harvard Law School, President Obama’s assistant on
homeland security and counterterrorism endorsed not only Article III
courts but also some “reliance upon military detention” and
emphasized the “place in our counterterrorism arsenal” of “reformed
338
military commissions.” A former assistant attorney general for
national security also has opined that although “[t]here is no inherent
tension between national security and the criminal justice
system . . . our criminal justice system has [its] limits, and is not always
339
the right tool for the job.” Although the government has not
specified all the boundaries of these tools’ usage with precision, it
appears that at least some forums overlap with the scope of other
340
forums. The Obama administration also has been complicit in the
preservation of military commissions. Its lawyers have continued to
defend aggressively the military detention of enemy combatants in
terms only slightly at odds with those offered by the Bush
administration. Rather than retiring immigration and criminal-law
powers, the White House in Democratic hands has preserved and

336. For an endorsement of the use of criminal process from a former official in the Bush
administration, see Charles D. Stimson, What We’ve Learned About Terror Trials from the
Underwear Bomber, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct 12, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/10/
12/weve-learned-about-terror-trials-from-underwear-bomber.
337. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203, 205–06 (2010) (requiring the secretary
of defense and others to participate in a detainee review process to determine, among other
things, “whether it is possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States and, if so, whether and how the
Secretary of Defense may effect their transfer or release”).
338. Brennan, supra note 6.
339. David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 1, 78 (2011); see also Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Speech to the
Heritage Foundation 3–5 (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/20111018_Jeh-Johnson-Heritage-Speech.pdf (arguing that “[t]he military
should not, and cannot be, the only answer [to al Qaeda]” and defending the use of Article III
courts).
340. The exception is the Obama administration’s commitment to process “suspected
terrorists arrested inside the United States . . . through our Article III courts.” Brennan, supra
note 6.
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defended those powers, for example by defending their aggressive use
before the Supreme Court in cases such as Humanitarian Law Project
341
v. Holder. Yet at the same time, and like the Bush administration,
the Obama administration generally has refrained from stretching the
boundaries of military detention beyond its postemergency uses.
Given this de facto, if implicit, consensus between two
administrations of dramatically different ideological stripes on the
utility of jurisdictional redundancy, it may be that arguments in favor
of preserving the forum status quo are not quite as outlandish as they
may appear at first blush. Equally, the reliance of both
administrations on established forums, rather than novations such as
the much-hyped national-security courts, counsels against high
342
expectations for entirely novel forums.
The fact that two administrations with strikingly divergent
normative commitments and distinct political constituencies
converged on an approach involving significant, but sparingly used,
redundancy is telling. The combination of excess adjudicative
capacity and cautious usage may indeed maximize the advantages of
redundancy while minimizing its costs. On the one hand, the
government benefits from the possibility of procedural arbitrage and
from the safety net supplied by sequential redundancy, allowing it to
minimize false negatives. On the other hand, it does so without
incurring the fiscal costs of creating new forums or imposing
demoralization costs associated with visible circumvention of Article
III. As to agency costs, judges operate under the shadow of
jurisdiction flight, and they thus have persisting incentives to innovate
in ways that accommodate the complexities of terrorism cases. At the
same time, even when they perceive no way of innovating without
violating core normative commitments, those judges are not in a bind.
They need not fear catastrophic harms from the rigid application of
constitutional rules because of the system’s reserve capacity.
Investigating agencies also have some choice between low- and highprocess channels such that their forum-choice decisions convey
information to political overseers. At the same time, the employment
of Article III as a strong default jurisdictional option preserves
marginal deterrence and generates incentives for investigators to
obtain good information and maintain their investigative skills.
341. Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
342. For a fuller development of the grounds for this skepticism, see supra text
accompanying notes 230–35.
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Attention to the full spectrum of costs and benefits associated
with forum choice, in sum, suggests that the status quo of pervasive
343
redundancy is surprisingly attractive. At the very least, proponents
of reform have not identified and analyzed all costs and benefits in a
way that can justify their proposals for change. They have failed, in
other words, to ask the right institutional-design questions in thinking
about forum choice.
CONCLUSION
The choice of forum for terrorism suspects is usefully conceived
as a question of institutional design rather than as a matter of legal
doctrine. It is not sensible to craft policy in this domain simply by
applying cumbersome tools of legal doctrine while ignoring the
complex effects of jurisdictional specification. Nor is it sensible to
craft policy by focusing on individual cases, like Warsame’s, as
opposed to attending carefully to the complex direct and indirect
effects of institutional-design choices embedded in existing structures.
The right question to ask is not “Where should Warsame be tried?” It
is “What options should the government have ex ante in dealing with
his case?” That is, the right question focuses on how the legal
framework of adjudicative institutions defines and channels the
government’s choices—a question that must be answered long before
Warsame’s shallow dhow comes into sight. Attention to this
institutional-design question suggests that the existence of
redundancy in Warsame’s case—exemplified by his seriatim exposure
to military and then civilian detention—may have desirable net
consequences.
Failure to attend to institutional-design effects, by contrast, has
blinded commentators to important questions. Leading reform
proposals on the left and the right are consequently myopic and rife
with unintended and unanalyzed effects. Partisans on both sides of
the aisle focus on one variable in a complex optimization puzzle with
many moving parts. They fail to see how jurisdictional redundancy
influences, among other things, error rates, innovation, investigators’
incentives, marginal deterrence, and information flow. Taking
account of these complex effects suggests that the considerable
jurisdictional redundancy that characterizes the status quo, if not
343. This tracks one analyst’s conclusion in the administrative-law context. See Marisam,
supra note 28, at 183–84 (“[T]he costs of avoiding duplicative delegations ex ante are too
great . . . . [I]t is efficient to let some duplication persist.”).
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ideal, may still be relatively desirable as one of the better possible
frameworks for dealing with the nettlesome problems of forum choice
for terrorism suspects.
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